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For decades emergency managers have strived to educate the American public on how to 
prepare for disasters. Yet many Americans are still not prepared, at least as preparedness 
is defined by our nation’s emergency management community. If the standard approach 
that the emergency management community has used for the last several decades is flawed, 
then the needle might not simply be stuck. It may, along with the entire system, be broken. 
Perhaps the problem is not just with the needle, which is simply measuring action or inac-
tion, but with the actions themselves and the messages used to promote them. This thesis 
explores whether the actions individuals are asked to take are reasonable based on identi-
fied risk, and practical and sustainable based on barriers such as income and lifestyle. In 
addition, are the crafters of the message cognizant of the importance of sense-making on 
how an individual may choose to act based on the way he or she senses and responds to an 
incident, as well as the personal perception of self? Recent Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency preparedness surveys and public education campaigns address the need for 
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Definition of Insanity: Doing the same thing over and over again and ex-
pecting different results. 
—Albert Einstein 
Every day, somewhere in the United States, someone is recovering from a disaster. While 
the number of declared disasters dropped in 2014 to 45 presidential declarations and six 
federal emergencies (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], 2104), for many 
Americans, natural or human caused disasters are nearly an annual occurrence.  
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator Craig Fugate has 
been clear about the importance of personal preparedness on the nation’s ability to respond 
to catastrophic disasters. Fugate was blunt at a July 2009 Congressional hearing, telling the 
subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management, 
“Every family that fails to take even the most basic preparedness actions…is a family that 
will pull responders and critical resources away from those who truly need such assistance. 
…” (Post‐Katrina, 2009, pp. 10–11). 
The problem this thesis explores is why, after millions of dollars and years of public 
campaigns, many Americans are not prepared for disaster, at least as preparedness is de-
fined by FEMA and our nation’s emergency management community. Perhaps the problem 
is not just with the receiver of the message. Could the problem also be with the message 
itself? Are the actions the public is asked to take practical based on barriers, such as income 
and lifestyle, reasonable based on identified risk, and reflective of personal perception of 
self and how an individual may choose to act based on the way he or she senses and re-
sponds to an incident?  
The research for this thesis began with several assumptions. 
• Current preparedness campaigns seem to imply that once the action is taken, 
the individual is prepared yet the investment in effort and money may be 
significant.  
• To achieve the desired outcome, the message must be redefined to ensure 
the actions being asked are reasonable, sustainable, and realistic.  
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• The public must understand the message, believe the actions requested are 
valid, and be able to act appropriately for the overall preparedness outcome 
to be achieved.  
• The current preparedness campaigns do not appear to changing long term 
behavior which will lead to the desired outcome. That is, a more resilient 
population.  
• If the standard approach the emergency management community has used 
for the last several decades is flawed, then the needle might not simply be 
stuck. It may, along with the entire system, be broken.  
• Perhaps the problem is not just with the needle, which is simply measuring 
action or inaction, but with the actions themselves and the messages used to 
promote them.  
Using a modified content analysis of the standard preparedness messaging along 
with specific survey questions from four FEMA surveys allowed the researcher to study 
the efficacy of the current personal preparedness messaging. A further examination of pre-
paredness messaging within the contexts of the Cynefin framework and the positioning 
theory allow for an analysis of how those models may influence acceptance and action.   
Overall, the number of individuals prepared for disaster remains stagnant. While 
the surveys are valuable, they measure personal preparedness based on a very specific set 
of actions defined by government leaders. Some of these actions may be universally desired 
and common to every citizen in every part of the country. However, some may not be 
appropriate or logical given the area’s risk or capacity of the individual. In those cases, the 
survey respondent may have determined the cost of preparedness as it relates to a specific 
action is not justified. What may be perceived by officials as barriers, may in fact be ra-
tional decisions based on understanding of threat and the perceived cost to benefit ratio of 
preparedness. Measuring outcome as opposed to actions may require a different tool that 
considers how an individual may choose to act based on the way he or she senses and 
responds to an incident and how the assumed position a person takes in a situation will 
influence their action.  
The researcher also looked at personal preparedness from the frame of positioning 
theory, which looks at the roles and rights, duties, and responsibilities that individuals as-
sume based on their perceived or actual position in the world. In a 2009 article published 
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in Theory and Psychology, “Recent Advances in Positioning Theory,” by Harre, Moghad-
dam, Pilkerton, Cainie, Rothbart, and Sabat, the authors explored new applications of the 
use of positioning theory to explain interpersonal encounters. Based on this theory, indi-
viduals can choose, or be placed in, the role of victim or survivor. That placement will then 
influence an individual’s perception of his or her rights as well as responsibilities (Harre, 
Moghaddam, Pilkerton, Cainie, Rothbart, and Sabat, 2009).  
The Cynefin framework offers another way to look at the public’s receptiveness of 
the personal preparedness messages. Developed by David Snowden, the Cynefin frame-
work organizes situations into five distinct domains, based on the correlation between 
cause and effect (Snowden & Boone, 2007). The five domains are simple, complicated, 
complex, chaotic, and disorder. Snowden advances that this model addresses differences 
in ontology (what is) and how that interacts with epistemology (how we know) and phe-
nomenology (how we experience) (Snowden, 2012). The positioning theory and the 
Cynefin framework both may provide significant insight into how to individuals receive 
and act on messages. 
Millions of dollars have been spent trying to convince members of the public to 
take responsibility for their personal preparedness. Regardless of the approach taken, the 
percentage of individuals and families that appear to be prepared for disaster has remained 
relatively stagnant, resulting in the analogy that the needle is stuck. Joe Becker, from the 
American Red Cross suggested the challenge is to get the needle moving on the percentage 
of those who are prepared (Statement, 2009, p. 4). FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate has 
said that families who fail to take basic steps to prepare for disaster pull responders from 
those who in critical need of help (2009, pp. 10–11). Garry Briese argues that the bar for 
preparedness is too high and personal preparedness should be refined to those actions most 
important to the outcome (2010). 
Ultimately, this researcher identified six findings based on the initiating assump-
tions. First, successful public safety campaigns, such as “stop, drop and roll” and “click it 
or ticket,” generally require a low investment in cost and time and have a clear and com-
pelling negative outcome if the action is not taken. The current preparedness actions require 
an investment in time—to acquire knowledge, develop a plan, prepare a kit—and money 
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to purchase and store the items for a kit. To be effective, both the plan and kit must be 
maintained.  
Second, with a few exceptions, researchers agree that understanding and agreeing 
with risk is a driving factor in an individual’s desire to be personally prepared. Some juris-
dictions, such as California, are using technology to help their residents understand the 
threats and risks of the community. It is past time for the emergency management commu-
nity at large to recognize that threats and risks are not universal and one generic message 
is not sufficient.  
Third, positioning theory advances that language not only communicates, but 
shapes the way individuals act based on how they “position” themselves relative to the 
language used (Davies & Harre, 2007, p. 2). FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate’s attempt 
to reframe victims of disasters to survivors is consistent with this concept of positioning 
theory. By positioning individuals impacted by disaster as survivors, FEMA is helping 
them assume the responsibility to be accountable for their own survival, as well as an im-
plied duty to help others. By assuming the role of survivor, people become not only ena-
blers in their own response and recovery but allow government resources to focus on those 
who are positioned, regardless of cause, as victims. 
Fourth, while the surveys are exhaustive, they measure personal preparedness based 
on a very specific set of actions defined by government leaders. Some of these actions may 
be universally desired and common to every citizen in every part of the country. However, 
some may not be appropriate or logical so the survey respondents may have determined 
the cost of preparedness as it relates to a specific action is not warranted or justified. What 
may be perceived as barriers, may in fact be rational decisions based on understanding of 
threat. According to a report released by FEMA in 2013, the percentage of Americans who 
have taken actions to prepare remains largely unchanged since 2007 (FEMA, 2013, p. 1). 
Knowing how to prepare and expense of preparation continues to be perceived as barriers 
by 25 percent of those surveyed (2013, p. 12). 
Fifth, the Cynefin theory suggests that individual preparedness may mistakenly be 
framed as simple—one problem, and one right answer. However, some actions, such as 
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preparedness kits or plans may morph and become complicated, with many potential solu-
tions. During disasters, the availability of resources, capabilities, understanding, and his-
tory of a potential threat may move an individual response into the complex domain with 
many known and unknown solutions with no right answer immediately evident. 
Finally, a 2008 Columbia University report suggests that a fundamental lack of trust 
that loved ones will be protected must be resolved if the disconnect between evacuation 
plans and individual action is to be eliminated (Redlener, Grant, Abramson, & Johnson, 
2008, p. 6). Even with known threats, the surveys indicate high levels of reluctance to 
evacuate, particularly if the respondent is unsure that her or his children or loved ones 
would be protected (2008). Each of these findings points back to last two hypotheses: if 
the needle is broken, perhaps the problem is with the actions the public is asked to take.  
As the emergency management community continues to challenge the public to 
prepare, there are several recommendations that may encourage a more resilient popula-
tion. Reframing what preparedness looks like, focusing on outcomes, rather than actions 
and looking for new ways to include the community in the conversation may prompt new 
ways to prepare for disasters. Rethinking how preparedness is measured and conducting 
studies on whether actions actually effect outcome will allow more refinement of the mes-
sage and rigor to the conversation. Finally, recognizing personal choice and planning for 
action, as well as inaction, will allow emergency managers to better prepare for the needs 
of their populations. 
The findings led the researcher to six recommendations.   
Reframe the Concept of Preparedness 
A disaster kit, prepackaged and stored away to be only used in a disaster is not 
practical or sustainable action for many Americans. It is costly and takes time, attention, 
and desire to maintain. Reframing the requirement away from a disaster kit to one that 
focuses on the ability to sustain self and family for 72 hours with supplies currently on 
hand may be far more achievable for most Americans. For instance, pantry stocked with 
canned goods and daily supplies that can be opened and eaten cold if necessary may be a 
better option than a packaged emergency supply kit loaded with Spam and cans of tuna. 
 xvii 
The most effective preparedness solution for individuals and families challenged by lack 
of money or storage may be to identify a nearby location, either with family or friends, 
where they can safely weather the storm. Some campaigns and approaches are beginning 
to look for alternate ways for individuals to be prepared, relying less on the kit concept and 
more on an outcome of preparedness, whatever that looks like. 
Focus on the Outcome Rather Than Actions 
The steps to preparedness—get a kit, make a plan, be informed, be involved—sim-
ple solutions to a relatively known problem become far less important. A diverse and dy-
namic set of flexible solutions created by the stakeholders is what is needed in this compli-
cated and complex environment, ultimately leading to the desired outcome: a resilient so-
ciety. 
Create Opportunities for Dialogue with Impacted Individuals with no Preset Out-
come 
Communication with the public, as opposed to emergency managers and profes-
sional communicators, may lead to innovative ideas that meet the needs in non-traditional 
ways.  
Refine Personal Preparedness Surveys to Allow for Measurement of Alternate Ways 
to Prepared May Actually Result in a More Prepared Individual 
While it may be valuable to ask the standard question about a preparedness kit set 
aside to be used only during disaster, it is important to probe the negative responses to get 
a more accurate level of preparedness. Asking questions about stored food not in a kit or 
the ability to access stored water in other areas of the home not only measures a different 
type of preparedness, it moves the discussion about preparedness in new and equally valid 
directions.  
Conduct Post-Disaster Studies of the Efficacy of Personal Preparedness 
The author could find no studies on whether being prepared makes a family more 
resilient or, as just more comfortable. There appears to be no empirical evidence appears 
to support the common assumption that when the waters rise, the wind blows, or the earth 
shakes, someone who “has a kit, a plan and is informed” has a greater chance of survival 
and successful recovery than his or her neighbor, who does not. Emergency management 
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websites and publications seem to posit that personal preparedness pays dividends in less-
ened impacts and faster recovery; however, there do not appear to be readily available post-
disaster statistics to validate that claim.  
Finally, Consider That Perhaps the Needle Has Moved as Far as It Can 
Maybe the needle is stuck on half full because that is all the juice there is. Perhaps 
it is time to recognize that those who can are preparing, although perhaps not to the standard 
the government proposes. Some of those who are not prepared may intentionally be choos-
ing to refuse that role. Others may be placed, by choice or circumstance, in the victim role 
and may be unable to prepare. Emergency preparedness campaigns should continue, albeit 
with a reframed message that better reflects practical, sustainable, and risk appropriate ac-
tions, but it may be time to stop obsessing over the lack of preparedness. While the emer-
gency management community can continue to march to the drumbeat of “get a kit, make 
a plan, be informed,” it must recognize that many may choose to ignore that beat and march 
instead to their own. 
Conclusion  
As the frequency and cost of disasters increases, a clear understanding of and agree-
ment on the desired outcome of preparedness is more important than simply measuring kits 
and plans. There are many roads to resiliency; encouraging multiple paths may lead to a 
stronger, sounder, more resilient solution that driving everyone down the same highway. 
At the end of the day, the fact that all get to the final destination is what is important; how 
they get there is negotiable. 
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I. PERSONAL PREPAREDNESS: IS THE NEEDLE STUCK? 
Definition of Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and ex-
pecting different results. 
—Albert Einstein 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Every day, somewhere in the United States, someone is recovering from a disaster. 
According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), in 2011 there were 
99 federally declared disasters impacting 45 states (Federal Emergency Management 
Agency [FEMA] 2014). That same year, there were another 29 federal emergency decla-
rations issued for emergency response efforts and debris removal, and countless other state 
and local declarations that did not rise to the level of a federal disaster (2014). The number 
of declared disasters dropped significantly in 2014, with only 45 presidential declarations 
and six federal emergencies (2104). However, for many Americans, natural or human 
caused disasters are nearly an annual occurrence. In 2014, there were 2,106 wildfires of 
which 33 received a FEMA fire declaration (2014). According to the National Interagency 
Fire Center (NIFC), the federal government spent $1,522,149,000 on fire suppression in 
2014. This figure does not include federal, state, or local recovery costs or private insurance 
and unreported loss (National Interagency Fire Center [NIFC], 2104). Hurricane season 
along the Gulf Coast and eastern U.S. kicks off every year on June 1 with exhortations for 
residents to stock up on food and water, check the hurricane shutters and know when, 
where, and how to evacuate (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], 
n.d.).  
It seems like every week, the media report a new disaster that has destroyed homes, 
forced evacuations, or left hundreds without power and critical resources. Yet, despite the 
regularity and frequency of disasters and the countless websites, brochures, books, and 
presentations devoted to educating the American public on how, when, and why they 
should prepare, many Americans are still unprepared for disaster. According to a 2012 
1 
FEMA National Survey, change in the number of individuals taking preparedness actions 
has remained relatively stagnant since 2007 (FEMA, 2009).  
By any measure, Hurricane Katrina was catastrophic. On August 27, as Hurricane 
Katrina spiraled towards the Gulf Coast, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin began issuing 
mandatory evacuation orders for specific areas of the city. On Sunday, he issued a manda-
tory evacuation order for all of New Orleans (Russell, 2005). By the time the hurricane 
made landfall, nearly one million residents had evacuated the city, but left behind were 
approximately 100,000 people, many with no access to transportation (Tate, 2010). Their 
only options were to rely on the city’s evacuation plan, make their way to a government 
shelter, or attempt to weather the storm in whatever shelter they could find (Tate, 2010). 
When Hurricane Katrina finally stormed ashore, it ravaged the Gulf Coast, devastating 
areas of Mississippi, swamping New Orleans, leaving thousands of residents homeless, and 
killing close to 1,850 people across five states. More than 1,500 people in Louisiana lost 
their lives as a result of Hurricane Katrina, and the majority of those were in New Orleans 
(Tate, 2010). The world watched as families perched on roofs, pleading for rescue while 
residents of the New Orleans’ Ninth Ward wandered debris clogged streets that resembled 
a warzone. The cumulative impact of poor governmental planning and lack of personal 
responsibility forced 30,000 people to take shelter in a leaking sports arena with no elec-
tricity and failed plumbing. Another 19,000 took shelter in a convention center with no 
stored food, water, or medical supplies or planned security (Tate, 2010).  
One could reasonably conclude that residents of greater New Orleans should be 
well aware of their risk for flooding. With nearly 50 percent of the city below sea level, 
New Orleans is bordered on three sides by water with Lake Pontchartrain to the north, Lake 
Borgne to the east, and the Mississippi River winding around the south (Tate, 2010). Cat-
astrophic hurricanes are not new to the Louisiana coast. For example, in 1909, the Grand 
Isle Hurricane killed almost 400 people and caused millions of dollars in damages (Devlin, 
2011). Fifty years later, Hurricane Betsy caused Lake Pontchartrain to overflow and spill 
into New Orleans. Original estimates, later proved incorrect, caused this hurricane to mis-
takenly be considered the first to cost more than a billion dollars in damages, spawning the 
nickname “Billion Dollar Betsy” (Absolute Astronomy, 2011).  
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In April 2005, FEMA issued an update to previously released national planning 
scenarios. Among the 15 scenarios, there were only two natural disasters, a 7.5 or greater 
magnitude earthquake occurring in a major metropolitan area, and a category 5 hurricane 
making landfall in a highly populated area (FEMA, 2005). The hurricane planning scenario 
projected 1,000 fatalities; Hurricane Katrina resulted in 1,500 fatalities in New Orleans 
alone. The scenario projected one million residents would evacuate and 150,000 would 
seek safe shelter; however, Hurricane Katrina drove nearly one million residents from New 
Orleans and caused approximately 100,000 to seek, if not safe shelter, some form of shelter 
(Tate, 2010). Finally, the scenario called for billions of dollars in damage and years of 
recovery. Hurricane Katrina caused $81 billion in damages (Tate, 2010) and more than 
nine years later, New Orleans is still recovering (“Nine Years Post- Katrina,” 2014). In 
spite of the city’s geography, government planning, and history of extreme weather events, 
many New Orleanians were not prepared for an event with historical precedence. The cit-
izens of New Orleans are not alone, however, in their propensity to ignore the obvious and 
fail to prepare for a known hazard. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Studies indicate that in spite of natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, wild-
fires, the annual spate of floods tornados, blizzards, and ice storms, too many Americans 
are still unprepared for disaster. A survey conducted by the American Red Cross in 2009 
indicates that while approximately 80 percent of Americans have taken some steps to be-
come better prepared, only 12 percent are prepared to a reasonable level, as defined by the 
Red Cross (DeFrancis, 2009). 
FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate has been clear about the importance of personal 
preparedness on the nation’s ability to respond to catastrophic disasters. Fugate was blunt 
at a July 2009 Congressional hearing, telling the subcommittee on Economic Development, 
Public Buildings and Emergency Management, “Every family that fails to take even the 
most basic preparedness actions…is a family that will pull responders and critical resources 
away from those who truly need such assistance…” (Post‐Katrina, 2009, pp. 11–12). The 
problem this thesis intends to explore is why, after millions of dollars and years of public 
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campaigns, many Americans are not prepared for disaster, at least as preparedness is de-
fined by FEMA and our nation’s emergency management community. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
Perhaps the problem is not just with the receiver of the message. Could the problem 
also be with the message itself? This leads to the following research question: Are the 
actions the public is asked to take practical based on barriers, such as income and lifestyle, 
reasonable based on identified risk, and reflective of personal perception of self and how 
an individual may choose to act based on the way he or she senses and responds to an 
incident?  
D. HYPOTHESES 
This research begins with the assumption that the current preparedness message 
and the way message adoption is measured is inherently flawed. To achieve the desired 
outcome, the message must be redefined to ensure the actions asked are reasonable, sus-
tainable, and realistic. The public must understand the message, believe the actions re-
quested are valid, and be able to act appropriately for the overall preparedness outcome to 
be achieved. Current campaigns imply that the activities are largely “one and done.” Build 
a kit, check. Make a plan, check. Determine how to evacuate, check. Each of these activities 
assume that once the action is taken, the individual is done preparing, at least until the plan 
or kit needs to be updated. Yet, what appear to be simple actions can require significant 
investments in effort and money.  
Contrast this with the public safety campaigns often considered successful. The 
following examples are lost cost, low investment actions with a clear and compelling out-
come. One example is the National Fire Protection Association’s long running campaign 
“Learn not to Burn” has been a fire prevention educational tool in American for the last 40 
years and has been credited with saving lives since the first year of its release (Cates & 
Milke, 2006). “Stop, drop, and roll” has become so common in American culture that it 
appears, without accompanying explanations, on popular television series such as The 
Simpsons and Girlfriends (“Stop, Drop and Roll,” n.d.). 
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Another example is the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
“Click it or Ticket” campaign couples strict enforcement and a clear message that seat belts 
save lives. According to NHTSA, the “Click it or Ticket” campaign is the most successful 
seat belt enforcement campaign in its history and credits the campaign with increasing seat 
belt usage by more than 10 percent (NHTSA, 2015). 
Each of these successful campaigns involve clear messages with simple actions and 
compelling outcomes if the action is not taken. In the case of the NFPA campaign, the 
negative outcome is physical injury, and in the case of NHTSA’s “Click it or Ticket” a 
punitive consequence is combined with the potential for increased injury if an accident 
occurs. These are actions that require a low investment in cost and time and have a clear 
and compelling negative outcome if the action is not taken. The current preparedness ac-
tions require an investment in time—to acquire knowledge, develop a plan, prepare a kit—
and money to purchase and store the items for a kit. To be effective, both the plan and kit 
must be maintained. For areas with limited disaster history, the value of such actions may 
not be immediately evident, making the perception of need appear unwarranted. 
The current preparedness campaigns do not appear to lead to the desired outcome, 
which is a more resilient population. The standard preparedness message expects public 
action while, with few exceptions, does not recognize the personal expense of time and 
money to implement and sustain the requirement. Recent FEMA preparedness surveys ad-
dress the need for long-term resiliency over simple actions but may not go far enough to 
affect lasting change in behavior (FEMA, 2009). 
If the standard approach the emergency management community has used for the 
last several decades is flawed, then the needle might not simply be stuck. It may, along 
with the entire system, be broken. Perhaps the problem is not just with the needle, which 
is simply measuring action or inaction, but with the actions themselves and the messages 
used to promote them.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses a modified content analysis of the standard preparedness messaging 
along with specific survey questions from four FEMA surveys to study the efficacy of the 
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current personal preparedness messaging. A further examination of preparedness messag-
ing within the contexts of the Cynefin framework and the positioning theory allow for an 
analysis of how those models may influence acceptance and action and, as a result, lead to 
a revised approach. Content analysis is a detailed, intentional study of a specific set of 
materials or work to identify common themes or patterns. In addition, content analysis is 
often done on forms of communication, which makes this an appropriate method to analyze 
preparedness messages (Prasad, 2008). 
The intent of the content analysis is to frame if the actions individuals are asked to 
take are reasonable based on identified risk, and practical and sustainable based on barriers 
such as income and lifestyle. In addition, are the crafters of the message cognizant of the 
importance of sense-making on how an individual may choose to act based on the way he 
or she senses and responds to an incident as well as the personal perception of self? 
The first step of this method was to analyze public messaging contained within the 
50 state emergency management website pages focused on personal preparedness. Approx-
imately 10 minutes was spent on each site. If the information could not be located in that 
amount of time, the researcher assumed that it either did not exist or was too difficult for 
most users to locate. In many cases, state websites had links to a preparedness guide that 
contained information such as state specific risk, planning tools, preparedness kits, special 
needs, pet care, and youth resources. In those cases, the guides were reviewed to determine 
if they met the above criteria. It should be noted the researcher is well aware that sites may 
have contained information that could not be easily located in 10 minutes, and the survey 
was not intended to imply that any specific sites are deficient.  
The website reviews were based on 10 questions intended to identify common 
themes and patterns that outlined recommended actions, relative risk and recognition of 
barriers to compliance (e.g., age, income, and language). Each question could be answered 
with a yes or no although question 9 required a subjective determination on the part of the 
researcher. Questions 1 and 2 identified whether the site relied on the standard messages 
from FEMA’s Ready.Gov (Q1) or used a different approach (Q2). Questions 3 and 4 fo-
cused on clear identification of specific risk (Q3) and whether preparedness messages are 
6 
 
linked to identified risk (Q4). Questions 5–7 addressed barriers to action, and question 8 
measured a sample of the website to determine readability based on a review using the 
Flesch-Kincaid readability grade level test. The Flesch Kincaid readability test uses word 
length and sentence length to determine the ease with which a sentence can be compre-
hended (Flesch-Kincaid readability tests, n.d.). Questions 9 and 10 look at innovative or 
particularly useful campaigns (Q9) and the extent to which new media is used to communi-
cate the messages (Q10). The specific questions are listed in Chapter III.  
The second step in the content analysis was to look at FEMA surveys. Since an 
initial survey in 2003, FEMA has sponsored four additional surveys in 2007, 2009, 2011, 
and 2012. All five surveys included questions designed to measure: the extent to which 
individuals are prepared for disaster; real or perceived barriers that may prevent individuals 
from preparing; the perception of vulnerability to disasters; and the demographic impacts 
on disaster preparedness.  
The results of the 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2012 surveys were summarized in a docu-
ment released by FEMA in 2013, Preparedness in America, Research Insights to Increase 
Individual, Organizational and Community Action (FEMA, 2009). Four topics were eval-
uated: preparedness kits; household emergency plans; warning systems, emergency evac-
uation routes and shelters; and barriers to action. Both the questions and the results were 
examined in relation to the research question:… are the actions practical and sustainable 
based on barriers such as income and lifestyle, and reasonable based on identified risk? 
The final piece of content analysis looked at the positioning theory and the Cynefin 
framework, which offer additional methods to evaluate how and why people act. A review 
of the Cynefin framework and the positioning theory within the context of individual 
choice for action or inaction provided a valuable insight into personal perception of self 
and how individuals may choose respond based on how they frame themselves within a 
situation.  
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F. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will add to the existing body of literature by evaluating if the actions the 
public is asked to take are practical based on barriers, such as income and lifestyle; reflec-
tive of personal perception of self, and how an individual may choose to act based on the 
way he or she senses and responds to an incident; and reasonable based on identified risk.  
There is significant amount of research on the demographics of who is prepared, to 
what extent they are prepared, and what might be motivating or preventing them from being 
prepared. Although some studies identify possible motivators to action, far fewer studies 
identify strategies that address and attempt to resolve some of those specific barriers. Un-
derstandable and actionable community specific risk assessments available to the public 
appear to be limited, and, to date, most preparedness campaigns focus on simple, generic 
actions rather than sustained, lifestyle changes.  
There is a wealth of literature attempting to define why some Americans prepare 
themselves and their families for disaster and others do not. For the last several years, 
FEMA and the American Red Cross have relied on various iterations of a simple, three 
step message: get a plan, get a kit, and be informed. In spite of the relative consistency of 
the message and its delivery, a significant percentage of the public appears to disregard it, 
either through lack of motivation, lack of understanding, or other barriers that prevent ac-
tion.  
G. LIMITATIONS OF METHOD 
The content analysis method has several limitations that prevent it from providing 
a definitive analysis of the efficacy of current practices of personal preparedness messag-
ing. First, the website analysis was intentionally cursory, under the theory that if the infor-
mation was not readily available, people may not spend significant time and effort attempt-
ing to locate it. In addition, only websites were reviewed, generally limiting the review to 
that information provided via the Internet. The exceptions to this limitation are the manuals 
and guides saved in a portable document format (PDF) for download by the viewer. 
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The author was unable to locate surveys, studies, or analyses that determine 
whether or not personal preparedness kits or plans really make a difference. No empirical 
evidence appears to exist that supports the common assumption that when the waters rise, 
or the wind blows, or the earth shakes, someone who “has a kit, a plan and is informed,” 
has a greater chance of survival and successful recovery than his or her neighbor, who does 
not. Officials believe that personal preparedness pays dividends in lessened impacts and 
faster recovery; but there do not appear to be post disaster statistics, at least readily avail-
able, to validate that claim.  
Finally, while the surveys are exhaustive, they measure personal preparedness 
based on a very specific set of actions defined by government leaders. Some of these ac-
tions may be universally desired and common to every citizen in every part of the country; 
however, some may not be appropriate or logical so the survey respondents may have de-
termined the cost of preparedness as it relates to a specific action is not warranted or justi-
fied. What may be perceived as barriers, may in fact be rational decisions based on an 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing. 
—Socrates 
The issue of personal preparedness has received significant attention over the past 
several decades, with a noticeable increase following the attacks on September 11, 2001 
and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. No one has espoused this need more forcefully 
than FEMA administrator Craig Fugate. In testimony before Congress and in presentations 
to state and local emergency managers and in media interviews, Fugate has been clear 
about the importance of personal preparedness on the nation’s ability to respond to cata-
strophic disasters.  
…a recent survey found that only half of Americans have put together an 
emergency kit, and less than half—only 40 percent—have created a family 
emergency plan. I cannot emphasize enough just how problematic this 
could prove in a catastrophic environment, not only to the households but 
to the efficacy of the overall incident management effort. Every family that 
fails to take even the most basic preparedness actions, such as having suffi-
cient water and nonperishable food to support the family for at least 72 
hours, is a family that will pull responders and critical resources away from 
those who truly need such assistance… (Post‐Katrina, 2009, pp. 10–11). 
The business community also recognizes the criticality of a prepared population. In 
an April 2011 report issued by the Center for Infrastructure and Homeland Security, author 
Irma Clark focuses on personal preparedness as a key element of a strong workplace con-
tinuity of operations plan. She suggests that employee responsiveness (to the employer) 
following a crisis or disaster is contingent on the employee’s level of personal preparedness 
prior to the disaster. An unprepared employee will be forced to choose between job and 
family and will likely choose family first (Clark, 2011). 
The available literature on the level of personal preparedness and the barriers to 
preparedness is extensive. Surveys analyze who is prepared and why those who are not, do 
not prepare. Government reports try to identify what, or who, is to blame for the seeming 
lack of preparedness taken by Americans and posit solutions to encourage more to prepare. 
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Moreover, sociologist and psychologists theorize on why some prepare and others do not 
and if fear really motivates action. Meanwhile, a recent emphasis on engaging the whole 
community and promoting a culture of resilience has spawned new ideas and new literature 
on personal preparedness. 
With such an abundance of information, narrowing the research to credible, rele-
vant, and useful information is critical to this literature review. The research question this 
thesis intends to explore—are the actions the public is asked to take are practical based on 
barriers, such as income and lifestyle; reflective of personal perception of self and how an 
individual may choose to act based on the way he or she senses and responds to an incident; 
and reasonable based on identified risk—lead this literature review into four categories of 
review: 
• Literature that educates or encourages preparedness actions through stand-
ard messages, campaigns, websites, and brochures. 
• Survey instruments that measure current levels of personal preparedness, 
message acceptance, and action in relation to the questions asked. 
• Literature that defines the barriers that may prevent individuals from receiv-
ing, understanding, or acting on personal preparedness message. 
• Research into human behavior and dynamics using the positioning theory 
and Cynefin framework and how they might influence personal prepared-
ness. 
A. PREPAREDNESS MESSAGES, CAMPAIGNS, WEBSITES AND BRO-
CHURES 
Federal agencies, including FEMA and Health and Human Services, state and local 
emergency management agencies and major non-profit organizations, such as the Ameri-
can Red Cross, have spent millions of dollars on education campaigns designed to create a 
more prepared society. An Internet search conducted on February 21, 2015 sampled web 
results for three preparedness terms. The term “individual and family preparedness” re-
turned more than 4.8 million hits, “personal preparedness” returned six million hits, and 
“personal preparedness challenges” 33.7 million hits. Many messages, regardless of their 
origin, rely on some variation of FEMA’s simple, three-step message: “Get a kit, Make a 
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plan, be informed” (FEMA, 2015). The message on FEMA’s website, Ready.gov, identi-
fies in detail what a family kit should consist of, what family plans should contain, and 
what kind of information individuals should know about their state and their natural and 
manmade hazards (2015).  
A review of 50 state websites revealed 43 follow the standard message found on 
Ready.gov with modifications for identified geographic threats or information for particu-
lar needs such as emergency preparedness for pets or the elderly. In some cases, the state 
website links directly to the Ready.Gov site with no modifications specific to location and 
overall, 35 websites provided a link to Ready.gov.  
The current landscape of emergency public information campaigns is littered with 
preparedness messages that rely on a simple, three-step message—a message that, to date, 
has proved largely ineffective. While some state and local organizations are modifying 
their messages to engage more of their citizens in personal and individual disaster prepar-
edness, the effort is sporadic and limited.  
A review of most of these personal preparedness campaigns establishes that current 
messages tend to target a population literate enough to understand the threat and financially 
secure enough to invest time and resources in a stockpile of supplies. The messages are 
detailed and specific, listing everything one might possibly need during the first 72 hours 
of a disaster, from bottled water to baby wipes. They encourage the development of a fam-
ily plan, a communications plan, an evacuation plan, and a pet plan. They assume a level 
of personal motivation and a willingness to accept the government’s exhortations to be 
personally responsible. What they do not do, with few exceptions, is establish why these 
actions matter beyond “being prepared.”  
FEMA’s new emphasis on the “whole community” may indicate a shift in its ap-
proach to personal preparedness. For instance, while the FEMA Ready.gov website still 
advocates building a kit, including locating disaster supplies in one or two containers, the 
new approach notes that these supplies are a collection of everyday items found in most 
households. Bottled water is still recommended as the primary way to meet the need of 
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potable water for 72 hours, but there are also instructions on how to safely store water in 
two-liter bottles, an action that requires no or minimal financial outlay. 
B. CURRENT LEVELS OF PERSONAL PREPAREDNESS, MESSAGE AC-
CEPTANCE AND ACTION 
The most significant literary source reviewed is government surveys and reports, 
which provide the closest picture of current levels of individual preparedness as well as the 
barriers to action. Since 2001, an array of national surveys have attempted to measure cur-
rent levels of personal preparedness, message acceptance, and action. One of the first sur-
veys to measure personal preparedness was sponsored by the newly formed Citizens Corps. 
This initial effort, conducted in 2003 by ORC Macro, a federal contractor from Maryland, 
was designed to provide a baseline on family and community preparedness. Using a tele-
phone survey, the contactors contacted more than 2,000 adults living in the United States 
(excluding Alaska and Hawaii) and asked the respondents questions focused on four areas: 
household preparedness, training, neighborhood preparedness, and volunteer service. The 
responses were consolidated into general conclusions, which were then broken down into 
regional and demographic profiles. In recognition of the need to create a baseline to meas-
ure progress or decline, this survey proves a valuable standard from which to evaluate later 
surveys and studies (FEMA, 2003).  
The Citizen Corps has conducted two additional surveys that attempt to refine the 
questions or focus on particular areas of personal preparedness. The survey results and 
subsequent analysis are published in citizen preparedness reviews that compile multiple 
preparedness surveys and reports into one document allowing for comparison and contrast 
while also affording the opportunity to assess different survey styles and approaches. The 
citizen preparedness reviews include surveys from Council for Excellence in Government, 
the American Red Cross, Harris Interactive, and the Columbia University’s Mailman 
School of Public Health (FEMA, 2006, 2007, 2009). 
These surveys provide a valuable means to assess current actions based on standard 
messages. From the first Citizen Corps survey in 2003 to the latest survey conducted in 
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2012, the questions have sought to identify whether individuals are hearing and under-
standing preparedness messages and, more importantly, acting on them. The Citizen Pre-
paredness Reviews allow ready access to a variety of survey tools and results, offering an 
opportunity to compare and evaluate various surveys conducted by government and re-
search organizations. The findings support the supposition that many Americans are not 
prepared for disaster and set the stage for the third area of sub-literature, the barriers that 
prevent action.  
The results of the 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2012 surveys were summarized in a doc-
ument released by FEMA in 2013, “Preparedness in America, Research Insights to Increase 
Individual, Organizational and Community Action.” According to this report, the percent-
age of Americans who have taken actions to prepare remains largely unchanged since 2007 
(FEMA, 2009, p. 5). Knowledge of how to prepare and expense of preparation continues 
to be perceived as barriers by 25 percent of those surveyed (2013, p. 12). 
Recent surveys are beginning to identify the various barriers that limit Americans’ 
level of personal preparedness, including individuals’ difficulty receiving and understand-
ing the preparedness messages and the physical, psychological, cultural, or other barriers 
that impede or prevent action. The surveys remain the most complete source of data on 
current levels of preparedness across the nation as well as the various impediments to in-
dividual actions but tend to be limited to measuring preparedness actions as determined by 
government. 
C. BARRIERS THAT IMPEDE OR PREVENT ACTION ON PERSONAL 
PREPAREDNESS MESSAGES 
National surveys, researchers, behavioral scientists, and practitioners are all begin-
ning to address the reasons behind the public’s reluctance to prepare. In 2003, the newly 
formed Citizens Corps began an effort to measure progress in personal preparedness. The 
first survey was intended to provide a baseline measurement of the public’s knowledge, 
attitudes, and behaviors in relation to individual preparedness for disaster. In recognition 
of the need to create a baseline to measure progress or decline, this product proves valuable 
as a standard from which to evaluate later surveys and studies (FEMA, 2003). Since that 
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initial survey in 2003, four additional surveys have been conducted, 2007, 2009, 2011, and 
2012. 
All five surveys included questions designed to measure the extent to which indi-
viduals are prepared for disaster, real or perceived barriers that may prevent individuals 
from preparing, the perception of vulnerability to disasters, and the demographics impacts 
on disaster preparedness.  
FEMA’s Citizen Preparedness Review (CPR) issue 5 analyzed studies conducted 
between spring 2006 and fall 2007 and incorporated results from six major national studies 
and several state or regional studies, including the 2007 Citizens Corps Survey. The 2007 
Citizen Corps Survey asked questions designed to determine how disaster preparedness 
differs by demographics, including age, education, gender, geography, religiousness, race, 
and income. Other surveys delved into the specific motivations that either encourage pre-
paredness or inhibit action. The update indicated several conclusions, including: individu-
als may not be as prepared as they assume, levels of preparedness appear to differ based 
on geographical areas, evacuation preparedness (and willingness) is evolving, and there are 
both specific barriers as well as new factors that influence personal preparedness (FEMA, 
2007). 
Several of the survey results appear to support the concept that geographic risk may 
make a difference in an individual’s willingness to engage in personal preparedness activ-
ities. Surveys included in FEMA’s CPR, issue 5 indicate that areas with well-known, evi-
dent threats (such as San Francisco or Miami) have higher levels of personal preparedness 
than areas with lower levels of threat lending credence to the concept that understanding 
and agreeing with risk based on location and threat is a logical motivator to action (FEMA, 
2007, pp. 10–12).  
Several studies uncovered additional barriers that either impede or discourage 
emergency preparedness activities. As with previous surveys, respondents were queried 
about known barriers such as lack of concern, time, money or knowledge about what ac-
tions to take. The surveys assessed in CPR issue 5 also identified new barriers or contextual 
issues that affect individual willingness to prepare. These barriers include unwillingness to 
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abandon pets, the belief that nothing they can do will affect the outcome, lack of confidence 
in government response or trust in government recommendations, and, as noted earlier, the 
belief that their preparedness level is acceptable for perceived threat (FEMA, 2007, pp 14–
15). 
A study commissioned by the California Earthquake Authority (CEA) and the Cal-
ifornia Emergency Management Agency (Cal-EMA) supports the argument that an effec-
tive public messaging campaign may overcome certain barriers by reinforcing the point 
that recommended actions can reduce loss and suffering. The study, conducted by Harris 
Interactive, built on prior research led by sociologists Dr. Linda Bourque of the University 
of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) School of Public Health and Dr. Dennis Mileti of the 
University of Colorado at Boulder. This research on how and when to communicate to the 
public led to the recommendations Harris Interactive delivered to CEA and Cal-EMA, that 
the “development of an evidence-based standardized message to be delivered in a con-
sistent manner over multiple channels, over long periods of time, via a coordinated cam-
paign among various local, state and federal programs and agencies engaged in earthquake 
preparedness” (Harris Interactive, 2011, p. 1). 
Using easy to understand language may also prompt more preparedness. The results 
of a U.S. National Adult Literacy Survey, discussed in a report prepared for the Plain Lan-
guage Ad Hoc Committee of the Productivity and Quality Commission (DuBay, 2004), 
reinforce the importance for public communication to be written in clear and understanda-
ble English, at a grade level appropriate for the audience. The literacy survey indicated that 
more than 80 percent of adults read at or below the tenth grade level and notes that experts 
recommend most public documents be written at the seventh grade level (2004). 
Although the Citizen Corps surveys do not address trust in government, several 
other surveys conducted by well-known institutions do. Since 2002, the Columbia Univer-
sity’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness and the Children’s Health Fund have 
teamed up to conduct annual surveys of public attitudes and personal preparedness. In ad-
dition to questions about personal and community preparedness, the surveys ask questions 
about confidence in the government and the respondents’ willingness to evacuate. Accord-
ing to the 2007 report, the public confidence in the government’s ability to respond as well 
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as provide accurate guidance remains low (Redlener, Abramson, Stehling-Ariza, Grant & 
Johnson, 2007, p. 2). The 2008 survey conducted by the National Center for Disaster Pre-
paredness, indicated when children are involved, the trust level sinks to well below 50 
percent. More than 60 percent of parents would ignore an evacuation order and go directly 
to their child’s school (Redlener, Grant, Abramson & Johnson, 2008, p. 3). The survey 
questions focused on whether parents would heed evacuation orders and school evacuation 
plans or disregard them if they believe the plans do not provide adequate protection for 
their children. When parents with school aged children were asked, “If you were given an 
order to evacuate your home or place of employment during school hours” only 31 percent 
indicated they would follow the evacuation order and reunite with their children later. Ad-
ditionally, 63 percent would ignore the order and get their children even if that action was 
in opposition to the school’s plan or a community evacuation order. The report recom-
mends that the disaster preparedness policy recognize the parent-child bond and address 
family unification as one of the primary principles of family disaster planning, and stresses 
the need to “… to plan with, rather than around, certain realities of human behavior” 
(Redlener et al., 2008, p. 6). The Columbia University report suggests that in spite of a 
significant emphasis on disaster preparedness, this fundamental lack of trust that loved 
ones will be protected must be resolved if the disconnection between evacuation plans and 
individual action is to be eliminated. 
D. BRINGING THE WHOLE COMMUNITY TO THE TABLE 
In 2011, FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate launched a new concept that advocated 
ensuing the whole community is involved in planning and response. FEMA released a doc-
ument describing the concept, “A Whole Community Approach to Emergency Manage-
ment: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action” (FEMA, 2011). This document out-
lines the intent of the program and offers suggestions for implementation. Aimed primarily 
at the state and local emergency management community, the program recognizes “the 
importance of bringing together all members of the community to collectively understand 
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and assess the needs of their respective communities and determine the best ways to or-
ganize and strengthen their assets, capacities and interests” (FEMA, 2011). Through this 
approach, FEMA hopes to build a more effective path to a secure and resilient society. 
The whole community concept suggests a philosophical shift away from a reliance 
on a standard set of actions to a recognition that to build a prepared society, we have to 
engage all members of the community, understand the needs and motivations of our citi-
zens, build on what currently works in community engagement, and “move beyond the 
easy to looking at the real needs and issues a community faces” (FEMA, 2011, p. 7). 
E. PERSONAL VIEWPOINT INFLUENCES ACTION 
Social psychologists suggest understanding the positioning theory may helpful as 
emergency managers encourage individuals to plan, prepare and be an active part of a com-
munity’s response. A 2009 article published in Theory and Psychology, titled “Recent Ad-
vances in Positioning Theory,” explored new applications of the use of positioning theory 
to explain interpersonal encounters. Based on this theory, individuals can choose, or be 
placed, in the role of victim or survivor. That placement will then influence an individual’s 
perception of his or her rights as well as responsibilities (Harre, Moghaddam, Pilkerton 
Caimie, Rothbart & Sabat, 2009). 
Positioning theory evolved out of role theory, a social psychological model that 
contends each person responds to situations based on his or her defined role (e.g., wife, 
student, child, and father). Within each role exists established behaviors that each person 
must fulfill to be successful within that assigned role. This theory posits that roles are static 
and generally not flexible. As such, people behave in a predictable fashion consistent with 
the role (“Role Theory,” n.d.).  
The challenge with role theory, according to Davies and Harre, in their article “Po-
sitioning: The Discursive Production of Selves,” is that evaluating actions identified by 
“roles” is static and based on formal, ritualistic aspects (2007). They contend that how 
people position themselves may be a more reliable precursor to their actions than their 
static role. A key element in positioning theory is belief that language not only communi-
cates but shapes the way individuals act based on how they “position” themselves relative 
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to the language used (Davies & Harre, 2007, p. 2). Craig Fugate, as director of the Florida 
Division of Emergency Management, and then as the Administrator of FEMA, understood 
this when he reframed those impacted by disasters from victims to survivors (Whitehead, 
2009). 
Discourse, or dialogue, creates a framework or narrative in which one positions 
himself or others. Davies and Harre assert there are two ways individuals get positioned 
into the narrative: interactive positioning and reflective positioning. In reflective position-
ing, the individual defines his or her own position; on the other hand, interactive position-
ing is defined by someone else. In both cases, the positioning may or may not be intentional 
(2007, p. 4). However, just as conversations shift and change based on input, an individ-
ual’s position can flex based on how the dialogue changes the narrative and, therefore, 
where each player in fits into the storyline (2007, pp. 2–3). 
Harre, in his September 2004 article “Positioning Theory,” suggests that if roles as 
identified within the framework of role theory are relatively inflexible and static, then po-
sitioning theory is about how humans change their positions based on the transitory and 
conflicting nature of language. According to Harre, people use three primary conditions to 
create their basis for action. The first is admissible social acts, in particular the illocutionary 
force, in which the meaning of a phrase or word is based on who is using it, where it is 
used, and for what purpose. The second condition is the distribution of rights and duties. 
The third condition is the story line or narrative in which an individual participates. Harre 
believes that each of these conditions influence the other creating a positioning “triangle.” 
The position assumed by an individual, in tandem with her rights and duties, will impact 
understanding of the illocutionary force of dialogue or message. These, in turn, may be 
influenced by the narrative or storyline of the event (2004, pp. 7–8). In addition, Harre 
posits that messages vary based on the context in which they are given, not just within the 
relationship of the sender and receiver, but the history of the practices and values of the 
message and language (2004, p. 5). 
An article in the Forum: Qualitative Social Research by Francisco Tirado and Ana 
Galvez on the impact of conflict adds a different element to the concept of positioning 
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theory and personal preparedness (2007). They suggest that conflict can be an opportunity 
for change as opposed to the traditional view that conflict is negative. Merriam-Webster’s 
online dictionary offers two definitions of conflict that inform the discussion on positioning 
theory. The “competitive or opposing action of incompatibles: antagonistic state or action 
(as of divergent ideas, interest or persons)” and “a mental struggle resulting from incom-
patible or opposing needs, drives, wishes or external or internal demands” (“Conflict,” 
n.d.). 
Tirado and Galvez posit that conflict is not inherently negative but rather can pro-
vide the opportunity to identify solutions and outcomes not immediately contemplated 
(2007). The two summarize the main characteristics of this positive view with four points: 
• Conflict is an opportunity that can cause transformative change. 
• Conflict must be analyzed within the social, cultural and situational context 
in which it occurs. As such, it is dynamic. 
• Conflict is a complex situation that must avoid simplistic or monocausal 
explanations that attribute the conflict to a single, dominant factor. 
• Effective conflict requires discourse (Tirado & Galvez, 2007 pp. 3–4). 
If personal preparedness can be framed as a complex situation, analyzed within 
societal context, and openly discussed among the whole community, there may be oppor-
tunities for effective preparedness not yet identified. Recognition of and embracing the 
conflict may yield new ideas that transform the preparedness landscape. 
F. THE CYNEFIN FRAMEWORK: MAKING SENSE OUT OF DECISION 
MAKING 
Another way to look at personal preparedness is through the lenses of a new con-
struct, the Cynefin framework, initially developed by David Snowden as a knowledge man-
agement tool to help understand how informal networks allow more connectivity and easier 
integration of ideas and abilities than formal networks. Snowden has authored several 
pieces, both with and without co-authors, on the Cynefin framework. For example, Snow-
den wrote about the development of the Cynefin framework in a seven-part series called 
“The Origins of Cynefin,” posted on his blog in 2010; the entire series can now be accessed 
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on the Cognitive Edge website. The series provides a “behind the scenes” look at how the 
framework evolved (Snowden, 2012).  
After a decade of revision, his early work evolved into a Cynefin model that created 
four decision models:  
• Known: sense-categorize-respond 
• Knowable: sense-analyze-respond 
• Unknowable: complex: probe-sense-respond 
• Unknowable: chaotic: act-sense-respond (Snowden, 2012) 
In another piece, Snowden and Cynthia F. Kurtz presented the Cynefin framework 
in their 2003 article, “The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-making in a Complex and 
Complicated World.” They considered Cynefin a sense-making framework, a model that 
helps individuals give meaning to experience (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003).  
In 2005, Snowden wrote an article for Management Today, “Multi-ontology sense 
making, a new simplicity in decision making,” which resulted in the Cynefin framework 
model that is the standard today (2005). This revised model replaced known and unknow-
able with simple and complicated and was the model used for the article written by Snow-
den and Mary Boone for the Harvard Business Review in 2007 called “A Leader’s Frame-
work for Decision Making” (2007).  
The Cynefin framework organizes situations into five distinct domains, based on 
the correlation between cause and effect. The five domains encompass simple, compli-
cated, complex and chaotic. Disorder is the wild card, the center of the space with no pri-
mary relationship to the other four (see Figure 1). The movement between the domains is 
not linear; in other words, it does not have to flow from simple to complicated and so on. 
In fact, based on the situation, it is relatively easy to move from the simple domain directly 
into chaotic if the problems and issues are not addressed appropriately. Within the Cynefin 
framework, the simple domain is characterized by stable situations with clear cause and 
effect relationships. In this domain, leaders must “sense, categorize, and respond to a situ-
ation” (Snowden & Boone, 2007, p. 2). According to Snowden and Boone, this is the 




Figure 1.  Cynefin Framework (from ScrumSense, n.d.) 
The second domain is the complicated domain. This is the “realm of the known 
unknowns.” This domain, unlike the simple, may have multiple right answers to a given 
question. The cause and effect relationship is in place, but not clearly evident to everyone. 
In this domain, leaders must “sense, analyze and respond” as opposed to the simple domain 
where leaders must “sense, categorize and respond” (Snowden & Boone, 2007, p. 3). This 
domain relies on experts to analyze the situation and, ultimately, someone must pick the 
best solution among many “right” solutions 
To the left of complicated, is the third domain, the complex domain. In this domain, 
although a right answer may exist, it may not be known until much later after the fact. This 
domain is unpredictable and outcomes are not clear; in this domain, leaders must “probe, 
sense and then respond.” Snowden and Boone call this domain the “realm of the unknown 
unknowns” (2007, p. 5). Disasters and disaster preparedness are complex problems and the 
solutions are unpredictable and in many cases, not evident until after the event.  
In the fourth domain, chaotic, there is no clear cause and effect and the shifting 
landscape makes the attempt to find the right answer an exercise in futility. Snowden and 
Boone call this the “realm of the unknowables” and place September 11, 2001 into this 
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domain (2007, p. 5). In this domain, the only response is to act quickly and decisively to 
create stability and move the situation from chaotic to complex. 
The final domain, disorder, is a wild card. With no clear relationship to any of the 
other domains, disorder reigns and the response is up for grabs by whomever can dominate 
the playground. Once the dominant players take control, they will default to the character-
istics of the domain in which they are most comfortable operating or that which meets their 
ultimate goal. Rule brokers will default to the clarity of the simple domain and those deci-
sion makers driven by research and data will default to the complicated domain. Intellectual 
residents of “think tanks” will look to the complex domain and emergent practices, and 
opportunists will use chaos to grab power and cement their position. This is not an indict-
ment on any particular style or preference but rather a recognition that people gravitate 
towards domains that reflect their strengths and preferences. According to Kurtz and Snow-
den (2003), in an emerging situation, there is value in decision makers agreeing to reduce 
the size of this domain to achieve consensus on action. Put another way, pull the wild card 
out of the deck (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003).  
In Snowden’s final article in his blog series, he advances that this model now ad-
dresses differences in ontological (what is), how that interacts with epistemology (how we 
know), and phenomenology (how we experience) (2012). Helping people understand those 
three differences may impact their willingness to prepare. 
G. SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW  
In spite of millions of dollars invested in public education campaigns, a significant 
number of Americans are still unprepared for disasters. Most government emergency man-
agement agencies follow a variation of the standard message found on Ready.gov with 
minor modifications for identified geographic threats or information for particular needs 
such as emergency preparedness for pets or the elderly. The standard message identifies 
how to create a preparedness kit and develop a family emergency plan, where to go for 




Since 2001, an array of national surveys have attempted to measure current levels 
of personal preparedness, message acceptance, and action. These surveys provide a valua-
ble means to assess current actions based on standard messages. From the first Citizen 
Corps survey in 2003 to the latest survey conducted in 2012, the surveys have sought to 
identify whether individuals were hearing and understanding preparedness messages and, 
more importantly, acting on them. While the surveys remain the most complete source of 
data on current levels of preparedness across the nation as well as identifying various im-
pediments to individual actions, they are limited to measuring preparedness actions against 
criteria determined by government. As a result, there is a gap in literature that measures 
preparedness against standards different from the norm.  
Several of the survey results appear to support the concept that geographic risk may 
make a difference in an individual’s willingness to engage in personal preparedness activ-
ities. Other barriers include unwillingness to abandon pets, the belief that nothing they can 
do will affect the outcome, lack of confidence in government response or trust in govern-
ment recommendations, and, as noted earlier, the belief that their preparedness level is 
acceptable for perceived threat (FEMA, 2007). 
The positioning theory and the Cynefin framework offer additional methods to 
evaluate how and why people act. The positioning theory contends that individuals can 
choose, or be placed, in the role of victim or survivor. That placement will then influence 
an individual’s perception of his or her rights as well as responsibilities (Harre et al., 2009).  
The Cynefin framework offers another way to look at the public’s receptiveness of 
the personal preparedness messages. Developed by David Snowden, the Cynefin frame-
work organizes situations into five distinct domains, based on the correlation between 
cause and effect (Snowden & Boone, 2007). The five domains are simple, complicated, 
complex, chaotic, and disorder. Snowden advances that this model addresses differences 
in ontology (what is) and how that interacts with epistemology (how we know) and phe-
nomenology (how we experience) (Snowden, 2012). The positioning theory and the 
Cynefin framework both may provide significant insight into how to individuals receive 
and act on messages. 
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While personal preparedness messages encourage specific actions, they appear un-
able to motivate a segment of the population. Most personal preparedness messages are 
based on a very specific set of actions that may not be practical, sustainable, or reasonable 
to many Americans. To change attitudes and actions, there must be a clear, actionable mes-
sage. If the message is not acted on, the barriers to action must be identified and, if possible, 
removed. Understanding how individuals or communities perceive their position and how 
to either realign that perception or play to it may lead to messages that result in more action. 
Likewise, evaluating messages against the Cynefin framework, particularly how reality 
(ontology) intersects with understanding (epistemology) and experience (phenomenology) 
may lead to messages that better resonate with the publics they are designed to inspire. 
The whole community concept emphasizes the importance of building social trust 
by working with communities to address local problems and layering preparedness mes-
saging on top of everyday situations and issues that individuals are already engaged in. 
Ultimately, this approach requires the emergency management community to take a differ-
ent approach to personal preparedness, recognizing that the abilities, capabilities, and de-
sire to be “prepared” are so dependent on other needs and outside influences that the issue 




III. THE MESSAGE MATTERS 
If you don’t like something, change it. If you can’t change it, change your 
attitude. 
—Maya Angelou 
This year the United States will recognize the tenth anniversary of Hurricane 
Katrina, the costliest disaster in U.S. history (Unger, 2013) and fifth deadliest hurricane 
(Weather Underground, n.d.). In 2011, our nation faced another deadly storm, Hurricane 
Irene, which brought record flooding to much of the East Coast. Hurricane Irene killed at 
least 45 people, caused approximately $7.5 billion in damages and left more seven million 
customers without power (NOAA, n.d.) These record setting events dominate the air waves 
and generate countless news articles and stories of victims and heroes alike. Yet, with the 
exception of the scale and scope, these natural disasters are replicated every day across the 
nation. Whether it is flash flooding in southern Ohio or tornadoes in western Kansas, our 
citizens are at risk of losing their homes, their possessions, and potentially their lives. Chap-
ter III will analyze the current approach to preparedness against the thesis statement by 
focusing on two distinct components of the research question. The first explores the actions 
the public is asked to take and the second if those actions are reasonable based on risk.  
A. IT IS NOT WHAT YOU SAY, BUT HOW YOU SAY IT 
The first study will focus on what the public being asked to do. Are the actions the 
public is asked to take practical based on barriers, such as income and lifestyle, rea-
sonable based on identified risk and reflective of personal perception of self, and how an 
individual may choose to act based on the way he or she senses and responds to an incident? 
Personal preparedness campaigns have been part of the national landscape since 
World War II. The Office of Civil Defense sent air raid wardens on patrol through neigh-
borhoods to ensure lights were doused and the block was secure (Wisconsin Council of 
Defense, 1942), and during the Cold War, sent Bert the turtle into schools to teach children 
how to duck and cover (Hubbard, n.d.). Hurricanes Hugo in 1989 and Andrew in 1992; the 
Loma Prieta and Northridge earthquakes in 1989 and 1994 respectively, the Midwest flood 
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of 1993, and the Palm Sunday tornado outbreak in 1965 all reinforced the need for personal 
preparedness (Woolsey, 2007). Every state emergency management agency in the nation 
has some kind of campaign that encourages the public to be prepared.  
Most preparedness messages, whether they originate from a state, FEMA, or the 
American Red Cross, advocate some variant of a simple, three- or four-step message: “get 
a kit, make a plan, be informed and be involved” (FEMA, 2015). The message on FEMA’s 
website, Ready.gov, identifies in detail what a family kit should consist of, what family 
plans should contain, and what kind of information individuals should know about their 
state and its natural and manmade hazards. Ohio’s websites promote a similar message. 
The Ohio Committee for Severe Weather Awareness page on the Ohio Emergency Man-
agement Agency website encourages all Ohioans to have an emergency preparedness kit 
customized to meet the household’s needs. A suggested supply list includes 43 items from 
clothing and bedding to food and water, duct tape and plastic sheeting, to cash and chlorine 
bleach. Ohioans are encouraged to replace batteries, food, and water every six months and 
to “rethink” their preparedness kit at least once a year. These websites and public infor-
mation campaigns are full of detailed information on personal preparedness. 
Every state emergency management agency website has some information about 
personal preparedness. An analysis of how the 50 state emergency management websites 
address individual preparedness was conducted for this thesis. Each site was reviewed 
based on 10 questions. Each question could be answered with a yes or no, although question 
9 required a subjective determination on the part of the researcher.  
The specific questions were intended to identify common themes and patterns that 
outlined recommended actions, relative risk, and recognition of barriers to compliance 
(age, income, and language):  
1) The site advocates some version of the standard message of be informed, 
get a kit, make a plan and be involved or the previous message of get a kit, 
make a plan, be informed. 
2) The site uses an alternate message, either in concert with or as a 
replacement for the three- or four-step message. 
3) The site clearly identifies the state’s specific risks.  
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4) The preparedness information is clearly linked to the identified risks. 
5) The site contains or links to information that may address some identified 
barriers to preparedness such as youth or elderly specific needs, pet care, 
and medical issues. 
6) The site contains information that may address economic challenges or 
offer ways to defray the cost of preparedness. 
7) The site offers non-English translations of personal preparedness 
information. This could include a link to translation services, such as 
Google translations.  
8) The site readability level based on a Flesch-Kincaid review. 
9) The site offers innovative or particularly useful ways to approach personal 
preparedness. This is entirely subjective based on the author’s opinion. 
10) The site links to mobile applications or other new media. 
Questions 1 and 2 identified whether the site relied on the standard messages from 
FEMA’s Ready.Gov (Q1) or used a different approach (Q2). Questions 3 and 4 focused on 
clear identification of specific risk (Q3) and preparedness messages that linked to identified 
risk (Q4). Questions 5–7 addressed barriers to action, and question 8 measured a sample 
of the website to determine readability based on a review using the Flesch-Kincaid reada-
bility grade level test. The Flesch Kincaid readability test uses word length and sentence 
length to determine the ease with which a sentence can be comprehended by the public 
(Flesch Kincaid Readability Tests, n.d.). Questions 9and 10 look at innovative or particu-
larly useful campaigns (Q9) and the extent to which new media is used to communicate 
the messages (Q10). 
The sampling of the 50 state websites indicates that every state uses some variation 
of the three- or four-step message. Although some states have modified the slogan, every 
state encourages a plan, a kit, or the need to stay informed (Q1 and Q2). The majority (45) 
of websites have identified risk specific to the state (Q3), and 43 have preparedness mes-
sages tied to the risk (Q4). In addition, 38 states have information about specific planning 
issues, most focused on children, pets, or senior citizens (Q5). Only five sites appeared to 
recognize the cost of preparedness as a barrier, and these sites provided alternate methods 
to build a preparedness kit or alternate means to provide solutions to certain needs, such as 
29 
potable water (Q6). Moreover, 22 state campaigns include either a link to a language trans-
lation service, such as Google translator, or have translations of preparedness information 
materials available (Q7). The average grade level for websites or guides was the eighth 
grade, eighth month based on the Flesch Kincaid readability test. The site that tested the 
lowest or easiest to read was at the fifth grade, fifth month and the site that tested the highest 
or most difficult was twentieth grade, first month (Q8). In general, the site language was 
easier to read than the guides, particularly if the guides went into detail about hazards and 
the science behind them. Additionally, several websites approached specific barriers and 
challenges in individualized or unique ways either by offering a different way to prepare, 
providing specific tools and information, or using innovative ways to elicit participation 
(Q9). Finally, every website promoted some form of alternate media, most often YouTube, 
Facebook, Twitter, and downloadable mobile applications (Q10). 
Examples of state websites that appeared to the author to address preparedness in a 
novel or unique fashion, or addressed specific barriers, such as economic challenges, in-
clude Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Maryland, Utah, and Washington. 
1. Alaska 
The Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management uses the 
phrase “Learn, Prepare and Prevail.” As suggested in the positioning theory argument, lan-
guage can set the stage for how individuals respond and using the word prevail creates a 
culture in which Alaskans, residents of “the last frontier,” will overcome and triumph over 
disasters (see Figure 2). Further recognition of some of the unique challenges facing Alas-
kans, the personal preparedness guide recommends building a seven-day kit, as opposed to 
the standard message of three days of supplies. The guide suggests starting the kit by in-
ventorying what is already on hand and using a long-term approach, which encourages 
residents to build a kit over 12 or 24 weeks. The guide tacitly recognizes the cost to prepare 
a kit and recommends using the schedule as a cost-effective way to build supplies (Alaska 




Figure 2.  Logo for Disaster Preparedness (from Alaska Division of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management, n.d.)  
2. Maryland 
Nearly every website promotes new technology and tools to help the public stay 
informed. Most often common are Twitter, Facebook, mobile applications, and alert sys-
tems. The Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) uses a product called Op-
erational and Situational Preparedness for Responding to an Emergency (OSPREY) to keep 
the public informed about current emergencies and hazards. The system merges data from 
multiple sources to help decision makers and the public understand what is happening 
around them. The suite of tools includes OSPREY Public, an interactive map that provides 
information on current weather and traffic conditions and the locations of medical facili-
ties. In addition, OSPREY Dashboard Public, as shown in Figure 3, provides a regional 
look at the status of power outages, weather, traffic, hospitals, and shelters in a color coded 
table. Both of these applications are available to the public (MEMA, n.d.). Having real- or 
near real-time information available to the public in easily digestible formats may help 
individuals make informed decisions about how to respond to events. 
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Figure 3.  OSPREY Dashboard Public (from Maryland Emergency Manage-
ment Agency, n.d.) 
3. Georgia 
The Ready Georgia program has a mobile application that can be downloaded onto 
a smartphone (see Figure 4). Created by the Georgia Emergency Management Agency and 
the Georgia Department of Public Health, users can search for history on local disasters 
and threats, receive alerts, create or update their disaster plan and key contacts and update 
their emergency supply list to monitor when supplies need to be refilled (Georgia Emer-
gency Management Agency [GEMA], 2014). Georgia is not the only state to promote mo-






Figure 4.  Ready Georgia mobile application (from Georgia Emergency  
Management Agency, n.d.) 
4. Utah 
The Be Ready Utah Guide to Personal and Family Preparedness, like many other 
guides, covers everything a family should do to prepare for an emergency, with some prac-
tical modifications and explanations (Be Ready Utah, n.d.). For instance, the guide notes 
that the 72-hour grab and go kit is something families should have prepared to take with 
them if they evacuate. Additionally, a stocked pantry should be part of the preparation for 
sheltering at home. This is a slightly refined message from the standard preparedness kit, 
which does not differentiate between the needs for sheltering at home versus evacuation. 
Furthermore, the guide also has non-standard guidance for water that identifies other water 
sources that may be accessed in an emergency, including the water heater, ice cubes, pipes, 
and the toilet tank (not bowl). Only a handful of sites identify water sources beyond the 
traditional, and this was the most informative (Be Ready Utah, n.d.). 
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5. Washington 
Washington State’s Division of Emergency Management has a website with infor-
mation ranging from to avalanche safety to weather radios. Under Washington EMD’s 
“Prepare in a Year” campaign, which encourages one preparedness action each month, the 
issue of emergency supplies is addressed in a brochure called “Extended Events Supply 
List.” The “‘why’ of preparing a supply list is answered up front, not because big govern-
ment decrees it, but because “you can choose comfort over inconvenience” (Washington 
Division of Emergency Management [EMD], n.d.). Residents are encouraged to identify 
what they need, then add one or two items to their weekly shopping list, spreading out the 
overall financial cost over time. Furthermore, many of the pages have illustrations that link 
to easy to understand brochures with illustrations or videos that describe the actions.  
6. Arizona 
The Arizona Emergency Information Network (AzEIN) is the state’s official source 
of emergency and preparedness information. The site encourages Arizonians to “Plan, Pre-
pare, Inquire and Inspire.” As with Alaska’s phraseology, using the word “inspire” may 
help create an environment that excites action by using nontraditional words and methods. 
For instance, AzEIN’s “emergency kit cook-off’” is an annual contest inspired by the non-
perishables in a 72-hour emergency food kit. The cook-off challenges professional and 
amateur chiefs to create a recipe using at least one of the featured ingredients, only non-
perishable pantry and kit items, and to use manual tools in food preparation. Although 
stovetops and ovens are permitted, the challenge encourages alternative heating sources 
that might be found in a preparedness kit, such as candles, chafing dishes, fireplaces, and 
charcoal grills or camp stoves used out of doors. 
In addition to developing a recipe, participants can go onto the website and vote for 
the featured ingredients. The 2014 ingredients included: chickpeas (protein), canned pump-
kin (fruit or vegetable), instant Ramen noodles (starch, grain or nut), almond milk (bever-
age), and dark chocolate (comfort food). The winning recipes are posted on the website 
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and include pumpkin spice cake and garbanzo pasta (Arizona Emergency Information Net-
work, n.d.). This unusual campaign not only draws attention and generates excitement but 
encourages the rotation of nonperishables in emergency kits. 
Other notable state websites that address barriers include New Jersey, one of the 
few to address what residents without transportation should do to prepare, and the Nevada 
and Arizona sites that have tribal information prominently displayed along with links to 
tribal specific sites such as FEMA’s Ready Indian Country campaign. Clearly, the need to 
address barriers and recognizing the “whole community” are beginning to take hold in the 
emergency preparedness world. 
B. WRITE FOR THE AUDIENCE 
One barrier that continues to challenge efforts is literacy and low literacy. The re-
sults of a U.S. National Adult Literacy Survey, discussed in a report prepared for the Plain 
Language Ad Hoc Committee of the Productivity and Quality Commission (DuBay, 2004) 
reinforce the importance for public communication to be written in clear and understanda-
ble English, at a grade level appropriate for the audience. The literacy survey indicated that 
more than 80 percent of adults in America read at or below the tenth grade level and notes 
that experts recommend most public documents be written at the seventh grade level. The 
site that tested the lowest or easiest to read was at the fifth grade, fifth month, and the site 
that tested the highest or most difficult was twentieth grade, first month. In general, the site 
language was easier to read than the guides, particularly if the guides went into depth about 
hazards and the science behind them. For this analysis, only the grade level was measured. 
The state level preparedness websites average grade level for websites or guides was the 
eighth grade, eighth month based on the Flesch Kincaid readability test. If, as the national 
literacy survey suggests, 48 percent of adults read at a fifth grade or below level, their 
ability to understand the message may be a very real barrier (DuBay, 2004). 
There are significant shifts occurring in the methods of preparedness messaging, 
however, like attempts to engage the public through novel campaigns such Arizona’s cook-
off and the Center for Disease Control’s Zombie Apocalypse, first released in 2011 (Center 
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for Disease Control [CDC], n.d.-b). The Zombie Apocalypse campaign is clever (see Fig-
ure 5). It encourages individuals to know what other threats are in their area besides zom-
bies, recommending local contact lists that include the zombie response team as well as 
family and other key contacts, and encouraging a preplanned evacuation route to ensure a 
successful evacuation before the hungry zombies attack. Each message centers on the zom-
bie theme, but it also recognizes the utility of these plans and actions for other events such 
as natural disasters. The evacuation section offers the following advice: 
When zombies are hungry they won’t stop until they get food (i.e., brains), 
which means you need to get out of town fast! Plan where you would go 
and multiple routes you would take ahead of time so that the flesh eaters 
don’t have a chance! This is also helpful when natural disasters strike and 
you have to take shelter fast. (CDC, n.d.-b). 
 
Figure 5.  Advertisement for CDC Preparedness Campaign (from CDC, n.d.-b) 
At heart however, the key messages remain the same. The CDC’s zombie attack 
preparedness campaign advocates being informed, having a plan, and building a kit. The 
approach may be novel enough to overcome those whose barriers are primarily psycholog-
ical in nature or who find the scenario just quirky enough to pay attention to the campaign. 
To assess the real impact, however, surveys must be conducted to accurately evaluate 
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whether the campaign was just a clever marketing strategy or a program that will result in 
meaningful changes in behavior and action. 
The review of state personal preparedness efforts indicates most messages tend to 
target a population literate enough to understand the threat and financially secure enough 
to invest time and resources in a stockpile of supplies. They encourage the development of 
a family plan, a communications plan, an evacuation plan, and a pet plan. Additionally, 
they assume a level of personal motivation and a willingness to accept the government’s 
exhortations to be personally responsible. In some cases, they may even be difficult if not 
impossible, for some citizens to understand, let alone act on, underscoring the point that 
illiteracy, or low literacy can be a barrier. 
C. RISK AS A FACTOR IN PREPAREDNESS 
This section will shift focus to the second part of the thesis question: are the actions 
the public is asked to take practical based on barriers, such as income and lifestyle; rea-
sonable based on identified risk and reflective of personal perception of self; and how an 
individual may choose to act based on the way he or she senses and responds to an incident?  
Research seems to indicate that threat and risk make a difference in decision mak-
ing and understanding both will motivate action. Areas with well-known, documented 
threats, such as San Francisco or Miami, have higher levels of personal preparedness than 
areas with lower levels of threat (FEMA, 2007, p. 11). Understanding realistic risk based 
on location and threat appears to be a motivator to action. The Americans’ traditional, 
somewhat generic approach to risk education may, in fact, be counterproductive. 
Government efforts to inform the American public about risk in such a way as to 
cause a desired action has long proved a challenge. A 2003 FEMA recommendation that 
Americans stockpile duct tape and plastic sheeting to be prepared for a biological, chemi-
cal, or nuclear attack by terrorists provided rich fodder for comedians lampooning the fed-
eral government’s prevention messages. This, in spite of the fact that the same shelter in 
place guidance has been promoted for years in communities within a specific radius of 
certain hazardous materials production facilities (CDC, 2012) The five-tiered, color coded 
37 
Homeland Security Advisory System fared no better—with comedians Jay Leno and Co-
nan O’Brien creating their versions of the system and political pundits from both sides of 
the aisle taking aim at the DHS and the system.  
In December 2011, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security released The Stra-
tegic National Risk Assessment in Support of PPD 8: A Comprehensive Risk-Based Ap-
proach toward a Secure and Resilient Nation. The Strategic National Risk Assessment 
(SNRA) evaluated known risks and threats that have the potential to cause significant harm 
to the nation at large, or could impact national security (2011). As such, the document 
identifies 23 national level events, such as natural disasters causing more than $100 million 
dollars in direct economic loss; technological or accidental events, such as dam failures, 
nuclear power plant radiological releases, or chemical spills resulting in offsite evacua-
tions; and adversarial attacks, such as chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-
yield explosive (CBRNE) terrorism, armed assault, or cyber-attacks. The full results of the 
SNRA are classified and the public does not have access to the details or the analysis. Since 
these are threats that will have an impact on a national scale, the public document is nec-
essarily generic and broad. The Department of Homeland Security recognizes the limita-
tions of the document and stresses that additional assessments at the regional and commu-
nity level are needed to help those governments appropriately plan and prepare for the risks 
they may face. Ultimately though, the SNRA is a document intended for government plan-
ners, not for the public (DHS, 2011). 
The United States has established risk assessment as a priority but primarily to in-
form operational and strategic plans. It is intended to cause a specific response as opposed 
to educating members of the public so they can make a reasoned, rational, personal re-
sponse. While public education about personal preparedness is a national priority, public 
education focused on risk does not appear to carry the same urgency.  
The federal system of government in the United States places the responsibility for 
public education on the states and local governments. While not a legal constraint, it does 
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mean that states and local governments are not bound to a specific federal model or ap-
proach to risk education. This may lead to fragmented approaches, but it can also lead to 
inspired and targeted state and local efforts. 
The Florida Division of Emergency Management website features an annual severe 
weather awareness guide published as part of an annual severe weather awareness cam-
paign. The guide includes information about area hazards, the science behind them, and 
includes instructions on how to make lightening and a tornado in a tube. It is easy to read 
and is filled with colorful graphics, dramatic photographs, and simple games, such as cross-
word puzzles and word searches. Topics include standard information such as all-hazard 
preparedness, as well as specific information such as tornado, lightning, and hurricane facts 
and safety actions; how to recognize and avoid a riptide; and how to create a safety kit. The 
guide is clear about the risks that face Floridians and how to respond to those specific risks 
(Florida’s Severe Weather Awareness Guide, n.d.). 
The Texas Emergency Management Public Information and Preparedness website 
was one of the easiest to navigate with clear linkage from threats to preparedness. Infor-
mation was specific to Texas and the site included links on a variety of threats and actions 
from farm and ranch preparedness to Ebola virus awareness. The Texas site reinforces that 
if the intent is to educate and not overwhelm, simple sometimes works best. (Public Infor-
mation and Education, n.d.) 
Unfortunately, detailed risk assessments are often difficult for the public to access. 
For example, the Ohio emergency management agency is required to complete a risk as-
sessment that guides emergency operations plan development and focuses mitigation ac-
tivities. This assessment is intended to encompass all the hazards faced by the jurisdiction. 
While it is sometimes made public, the public is not the intended consumer nor is the risk 
assessment written with the general public in mind. Consequently, although these plans are 
not inaccessible to the public, they are not easy to find and, once found, difficult to under-
stand. Post-September 11, 2001, additional risk assessments have been conducted focused 
on terrorist threats. These plans are generally classified secret or for official use only 
(FOUO) and not made available to the public. Ohio’s website does list general threats to 
the state, such as extreme heat, flooding, thunderstorms, tornados and winter storms, but 
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the information about the threats is generic and actions, beyond the standard three-step 
message, are general.  
Several states are using technology to help residents pinpoint their specific risk. 
One tool, the Map My Neighborhood campaign, used by Washington state among others, 
encourages communities to take a hands-on approach to risk identification. Residents, gen-
erally under the guidance of the local emergency manager, are asked to identify personal 
skills and equipment that might be useful in disaster response, create a neighborhood con-
tact list that helps identify those who might need additional assistance, such as elderly or 
disabled, and develop a neighborhood map that identifies locations of natural gas and pro-
pane tanks. In addition, residents are encouraged to learn what steps they can take imme-
diately following a disaster and to work together in the first few hours after a disaster to 
protect their communities and assess damage (Washington Emergency Management Divi-
sion, n.d.). 
The California Emergency Management website includes a function that allows 
residents to map their personal risk by entering in an address or a landmark. For example, 
when the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California is entered, a map showing 
the location of the school pops up and a list of hazards specific to the area is identified. In 
this case, the school is listed as being in or near the hazard “earthquake,” and it lists specific 
activities that can be taken to mitigate the impacts of an earthquake, including securing 
objects around the home and reinforcing structural elements such as masonry chimney. The 
page also lists what the area is not at risk for, such as earthquake triggered landslides and 
liquefaction. Furthermore, the page offers several sites for additional research and infor-
mation (California Emergency Management [Cal EMA], 2012).  
The results of a study, commissioned by the California Earthquake Authority 
(CEA) and the California Emergency Management Agency (Cal-EMA), suggest that an 
effective public messaging campaign must make the case that recommended actions can 
reduce loss and suffering. The study, conducted by Harris Interactive, was built on prior 
research led by sociologists Dr. Linda Bourque of the UCLA School of Public Health and 
Dr. Dennis Mileti of the University of Colorado at Boulder and led to 11 recommendations 
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on effective public messaging, including several that support current practice. One key 
finding was that while understanding risk is important, using risk messages that reinforce 
negative outcomes of lack of preparedness may not be as motivating as focusing on why 
people should prepare and on the actions that can reduce loss and suffering (Harris Inter-
active, 2011, p. 7). Harris Interactive’s study seems to conclude that the message is not the 
issue—the way the message is communicated is the issue. Messages need to be consistent, 
coordinated, regularly communicated, and action oriented to achieve the desired outcome: 
a prepared and resilient nation. 
The researcher’s analysis of state emergency preparedness websites indicates that 
while preparedness messages may be targeted to the state or geographic area, the general 
themes are consistent. Based on the current approach, being prepared means having a kit, 
making a plan, and being informed. It includes those physical steps that one can take to 
make oneself safer (more resilient) following disaster. A resilient population is one that has 
the ability to bounce back, to adapt to adversity, and return to a state of normalcy. However, 
the author would suggest that resiliency is more than being prepared for a disaster; it in-
cludes understanding the risk, accepting some measure of personal responsibility, and then 
proactively engaging in a solution.  
One can understand a risk and yet not accept the suggested mitigating action. For 
instance, most individuals can agree that influenza or measles pose a health risk. However, 
recent disease outbreaks have reinforced that many parents do not agree that vaccines are 
an acceptable way to mitigate their child’s risk of illness. 
Likewise, one can understand a risk and yet choose not to accept personal respon-
sibility for that risk. Most drivers understand that having a vehicular accident is a realistic 
risk of traveling by car. Yet, according to a press release issued by the Insurance Research 
Council, 12.6 percent of drivers are uninsured (Insurance Research Council, 2014). Drivers 
may understand the risk, but choose not to, or are not able to, accept personal responsibility 
and engage in a solution by purchasing insurance. The challenge for emergency managers 
is to develop messages that not only clearly convey risk but motivate personal responsibil-
ity and advocate multiple options to engage in solutions. 
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FEMA, under the momentum of Administrator Craig Fugate, has reframed the ap-
proach to preparedness. In 2011, FEMA launched a new program called, “Whole Commu-
nity” and released a document describing the concept, A Whole Community Approach to 
Emergency Management: Principles, Themes, and Pathways for Action. This document 
outlines the intent of the program and offers suggestions for implementation. The whole 
community concept is based on three primary principles, “understanding and meeting the 
needs of the community, engaging and empowering all parts of the community and 
strengthening what works well on a daily basis” (FEMA, 2011, p. 23). Through this ap-
proach, FEMA hopes to build a more effective path to a secure and resilient society. The 
whole community concept suggests a philosophical shift away from a reliance on a stand-
ard set of actions to a recognition that to build a prepared society, we have to engage all 
members of the community, understand the needs and motivations of our citizens, build on 
what currently works in community engagement, and “move beyond the easy to looking at 
the real needs and issues a community faces” (2011, p. 7). 
FEMA’s acknowledgement of the critical need to encompass the “whole commu-
nity” in the preparedness discussion was echoed by Garry L. Briese in a 2010 presentation 
on the EM Virtual Forum. Briese, a former FEMA regional administrator, recognized the 
challenges of personal preparedness in its current format, and discussed the need to inte-
grate current understanding about human behavior into personal preparedness expecta-
tions. His presentation focused on what he identified as the “four essential elements of 
life—communications, transportation, power and water.” Briese noted, “Twenty-two per-
cent of our population does not have a single credit card,” leading him to doubt the validity 
of the standard preparedness actions the public is asked to take, whether it is to develop 
and maintain a preparedness kit or to be prepared to evacuate when instructed. As Briese 
posits, “When you don’t have a credit card, and you’re living paycheck to paycheck, and 
using payday check cashing services, and you don’t have a bank account, it’s really diffi-
cult to do the things we’re asking” (2010, p. 2). Continuing on this theme, Briese suggests 
emergency management and government officials should recalibrate what we are asking 
of the public and hone in on the key things we want them to do, recognizing the limitations 
many of our citizens’ face. Briese also muses: 
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…are we asking too much and can we significantly reduce the list that we’re 
asking people to have available for emergencies?…I would much rather 
have more people meet a lower bar of preparedness with the key items, than 
fewer people meet a higher bar of personal preparedness with so many items 
that we are not going to have anybody be compliant with it for any period 
of time. (2010, p. 2) 
According to Irwin Redlener, director of the National Center for Disaster Prepar-
edness, in an interview with Melanie Kaplan, part of the challenge with preparedness is 
there is no clear definition of what it is. The guidelines for hurricane preparedness may be 
very different than the guidance for a pandemic (Kaplan, 2010). He goes on to note that to 
be prepared to the extent advocated by status quo can be both an economic burden and a 
storage burden (2010).  
This concern was corroborated by the author in an open discussion with several 
local emergency managers from Ohio in a 2011 December seminar. The managers were 
asked about current emergency preparedness messages and whether their citizens followed 
FEMA’s and Ohio EMA’s guidance to “get a kit, make a plan and be informed” (personal 
communication, December, 2011). Several directors agreed that a lack of understanding 
the threats facing a community was one reason for inaction. One director, faced with a high 
transient population, identified the need for a tiered system of preparedness, similar to the 
concepts of focusing preparedness efforts on the key items, as suggested by Briese. Some 
directors noted the storage challenges for those who live in apartments or condominiums. 
Most agreed that the in spite of bi-annual public awareness campaigns, many Ohioans are 
still not prepared for disaster (2011).  
Ohio is not alone in the challenge of encouraging personal preparedness. Every 
state emergency management agency provides information to its citizens on how to pre-
pare. Furthermore, nearly every state provides specific, detailed risk information on the 
hazards that threaten that state. FEMA, the American Red Cross, and other preparedness 
partners are using social media, technology, and innovative campaigns to encourage a pop-
ulation prepared for disaster. However, according to Garry Briese, a former FEMA regional 
administrator, emergency managers need to integrate current understanding about human 
behavior into personal preparedness expectations. In spite of new ideas, campaigns and a 
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focus on engaging the whole community, FEMA surveys seem to indicate that the needle 
is not moving very much. Chapter IV looks at four recent FEMA surveys that measure 
public preparedness and evaluates whether the needle is moving and if we are asking the 




IV. MEASURING RESILIENCE 
If a measurement matters at all, it is because it must have some conceivable 
effect on decisions and behavior. 
—Douglas W. Hubbard  
Chapter III analyzed public messaging in the context of the thesis question: are the 
actions the public is asked to take practical based on barriers, such as income and lifestyle, 
reasonable based on identified risk, and reflective of personal perception of self and how 
an individual may choose to act based on the way he or she senses and responds to an 
incident? Chapter IV will look at the questions in four FEMA surveys that measure under-
standing of risk, movement on specific preparedness actions, and identification of barriers 
that may prevent action.  
A. PREPAREDNESS IN A POST–9-11 WORLD 
According to Joe Becker from the American Red Cross, the needle is not moving 
on the percentage of those who are prepared (2009, p. 4). This is in spite of numerous 
surveys that measure the publics’ preparedness. In 2003, the newly formed Citizens Corps 
began an effort to measure progress in personal preparedness. The first survey was intended 
to provide a baseline measurement of the public’s knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors in 
relation to individual preparedness for disaster.  
In the Citizen Corps surveys, more than 2,000 adults living in the continental United 
States were contacted by phone and asked questions focused on four areas: household pre-
paredness, training, neighborhood preparedness, and volunteer service. The responses were 
consolidated into general conclusions that were then broken down into regional and demo-
graphic profiles. Recognizing the need to create a baseline to measure progress or decline, 
this product proves valuable as a standard from which to evaluate later surveys and studies 
(FEMA, 2003). Since that initial survey in 2003, four additional surveys were conducted 
in 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2012. All five surveys included questions designed to measure 
the extent to which individuals are prepared for disaster, real or perceived barriers that may 
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prevent individuals from preparing, the perception of vulnerability to disasters, and the 
demographic impacts on disaster preparedness.  
In 2007, the survey instrument was expanded to include questions designed to de-
termine at which stage of the stages of change model (precontemplation, contemplation, 
preparation, action, and maintenance) individuals were in relation to their personal prepar-
edness. The 2007 survey consisted of 15 topics such as risk awareness, disaster supplies, 
community and household plans, personal response, and demographics.  
The 2009 survey included 13 topics and was refined to incorporate a series of ques-
tions designed to determine perception of risk based on four disaster scenarios including 
natural, hazardous materials, disease outbreak, and terrorism. The 2011 survey included 
many of the topics in the two previous surveys and added questions on motivators and 
barriers, information from schools or other children’s programs, and mitigation activities. 
More questions were added to the community planning section, particularly alerting sys-
tems. Questions on specific risks were added to the sections on ability to respond and (if) 
preparing helps.  
The 2012 survey added no new categories or questions but limited the focus to 
natural hazards and honed in on perceived risk, training, supplies, household planning, and 
knowledge of community plans and hazards. Questions about demographics were asked in 
each survey to identify motivations and barriers related to age, work status, education, in-
come, functional needs, and ethnicity.  
The results of the 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2012 surveys were summarized in a doc-
ument released by FEMA in 2013, “Preparedness in America, Research Insights to Increase 
Individual, Organizational and Community Action.” According to this report, the percent-
age of Americans who have taken actions to prepare remains largely unchanged since 2007 
(FEMA, 2009, p. 5). Knowledge of how to prepare and expense of preparation continues 
to be perceived as barriers by 25 percent of those surveyed (FEMA, 2013, p. 12). 
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Regardless of the differences in each of the survey instruments, the overall intent 
of the surveys remained the same, “…to assess the public’s knowledge, attitudes, and be-
haviors on preparing for a ranges of hazards…” (FEMA, 2009, p. 1). To that end, the “Pre-
paredness in America” report explored three key areas: the relationship between behavior 
and an individual’s beliefs and experiences, the different profiles of the general public to 
allow for more targeted messaging strategies, and the impact of community on personal 
preparedness (2013, p. 1 ).  
B. UNDERSTANDING RISK 
All four surveys asked questions about the respondents’ perception of risk and the 
last three about the respondent’s knowledge of local hazards. In 2012, 46 percent of the 
respondents believed it was likely that a natural disaster would someday occur in their 
community. This is up from 40 percent in 2011 and 37 percent in 2007 (FEMA, 2009). 
Areas with well-known, evident threats (such as San Francisco or Miami) have 
higher levels of personal preparedness than areas with lower levels of threat. Residents of 
hurricane prone states are more likely to be prepared (62 percent) than the rest of the coun-
try (57 percent overall) (FEMA, 2007, p. 10). Understanding and agreeing with risk based 
on location and threat is a logical motivator to action. More than 60 percent of the residents 
of San Francisco and Miami cite the reason for their level of personal preparedness is their 
understanding that they live in a high risk (hurricane or earthquake prone) area (2007, pp. 
10–12). Intuitively, this makes sense to most people. Those who live in the Midwest are 
likely to have a basic understanding of what to do if a tornado siren sounds. Likewise, one 
of the first things taught to the author as a newcomer to Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska 
is what to do if there is an earthquake. 
Forty-six percent of the respondents in 2012 also indicated they were familiar with 
local hazards, an increase from 33 percent in 2009 and 32 percent in 2011 (FEMA, 2009, 
p. 6). These small but steady increases may be the result of more targeted risk information 
on state websites and in preparedness guides. If, as research suggests, understanding risk 
may play a part in taking action (Harris Interactive, 2011), then clear, accessible risk com-
munication is a foundational component of preparedness messaging. 
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C. PERSONAL PREPAREDNESS KITS 
Every survey has attempted to determine to what extent individuals have built their 
disaster kits for home, car, and workplace. In the first three surveys (2007, 2009, and 2011) 
the questions specify that the supplies are set aside, to be used only during disaster. This is 
of important because there are no follow-up questions that ask if the respondents believe 
that they have enough food or water available in their home, not necessarily set aside to be 
used only during disaster, to sustain themselves and their families following a disaster. 
Although the question does not include a 72-hour time frame, the 2009 survey equates 
disaster with an event that “could disrupt water, power, transportation, and also emergency 
and public services for up to three days” (FEMA, 2009, p. 67) 
The number of individuals reporting that they have supplies “set aside, to be used 
only the case of disaster” has fluctuated from a high of 57 percent in 2009 to 52 percent in 
2012. However, only 29 percent in the 2012 survey reported having updated or maintained 
their kits within the last year and could name three or more supplies in their kit (FEMA, 
2009, p. 8). 
Results of a similar survey conducted by the Center for Catastrophe Preparedness 
and were included in CPR issue 5. When asked questions designed to determine if respond-
ents’ preparedness actions agreed with their assumed levels of preparedness, approxi-
mately 50 percent of the survey respondents indicated they had an emergency preparedness 
kit; however, when asked what was in the kit, the number of respondents with fully stocked 
kits dropped to about 36 percent (FEMA, 2007, p. 4). 
As noted earlier, there are no follow up questions in any of the surveys that probe 
the respondent’s ability to sustain self and family in some other way besides a contained, 
set-aside disaster kit. Additionally, no questions ask if the respondent is knowledgeable 
about other means to acquire water or if the capacity to sustain self and family exists in a 
pantry or other location.  
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When this author has queried local officials and emergency managers at speaking 
engagements and conferences, the results have been even more significant. On several oc-
casions, audiences have been asked the standard question about a supply kit, “Set aside to 
be used only during disaster, to sustain yourself and your family for 72 hours.” In every 
instance, no matter the size or the make-up of the audience, no more than 10 percent have 
raised their hand in answer to the query. When the question is reframed to “do you have 
enough food, water and supplies available in your house to sustain yourself and your family 
for 72 hours,” the raised hands are closer to 85 or 90 percent of the audience. This suggests 
that perhaps the second question might better gauge true levels of preparedness by focusing 
less on a specific task, such as preparing and maintaining a kit, and more on what the de-
sired outcome of preparedness is, which may indeed look differently in Florida than it does 
in Ohio or North Dakota.  
Whether one has a kit or a stocked pantry is not as relevant as the ability to access 
food, water, and supplies when needed. In some cases, that may mean a kit, in others a 
pantry that is filled with naturally rotating stock based on the likes and dislikes of the fam-
ily. In still other cases, it may be a plan to relocate to a place where food, water, and sup-
plies are available. For some, the best and most practical option might be to go “over the 
river and through the woods to Grandmother’s house…” or to Mom and Dad’s or even to 
a son or daughter’s home that may have the space and funds available to keep a well-
stocked pantry and supplies. It may be reasonable to develop messages that help individuals 
identify what they have on hand that can be used for emergency supplies and have a list of 
where those items are rather than placing them in a separate kit.  
D. HOUSEHOLD EMERGENCY PLANS 
The surveys reviewed for this thesis do not ask questions about how the plans are 
stored and updated, only if the respondents have a plan, if they have discussed the plan 
with other family members, and if important financial documents are stored in a safe place. 
The respondents who have a plan and have discussed it with household members has de-
creased from a high of 42 percent in 2011 to 39 percent in 2012 (FEMA, 2009, p. 8). Most 
of the planning templates are focused on key contacts and information on what to do and 
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where to go in the event of a disaster. As more emergency management agencies, including 
FEMA, promote the use of mobile planning applications, future surveys may see an in-
crease in electronic plans, if only to ensure that key contacts are loaded into cell phones 
and electronic tools.  
E. WARNING SYSTEMS, EMERGENCY EVACUATION ROUTES AND 
SHELTERS 
Additional questions in 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2012 FEMA surveys asked about 
familiarity with community plans. The community planning questions asked respondents 
to rate their familiarity with key planning issues on a scale of 1–5 with 5 being “very fa-
miliar” and 1 being “not at all familiar.” The following areas were rated in at least three of 
the four surveys: community alerts and warning systems and knowledge of local hazards. 
The 2011 survey also asked about familiarity with community evacuation routes and the 
locations of shelters.  
Respondents reported being most familiar with their community’s alerts and warn-
ing systems. This is not surprising given the relative longevity of the Emergency Alert 
System, formerly the Emergency Broadcast System, the prevalence of outdoor warning 
sirens, in at least in some areas of the country, and the increasing use of National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration weather radios. As noted earlier, 46percent of the re-
spondents in the 2012 survey indicated they were familiar with local hazards (FEMA, 2009, 
p. 14). 
Familiarity with community evacuation plans fluctuated from 15 percent to 17 per-
cent, based on employment status, and familiarity with shelter locations from 16 percent to 
20 percent. The survey report broke the statistics down by employment status with em-
ployed and not employed having the highest percentages and part time employment the 
lowest (FEMA, 2009, p. 33). Given that many shelter locations are ad-hoc, activated when 
needed and not necessarily in static locations, and that evacuation routes are generally de-
pendent on a fixed threat, these results are not surprising. The all-hazard approach suggests 
that all Americans should be prepared to evacuate. While this is a perfectly acceptable 
assumption in a hurricane or wildfire prone area, it is not reasonable or realistic based on 
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perceived risk to many Americans living in other areas of the country. This is a meaningful 
measurement of individual preparedness when community risk requires pre-identified shel-
ters or evacuation routes. However, unless there is a static threat that requires pre-identified 
evacuation routes and standard shelter locations, such as a nuclear power plant, hazardous 
chemical facility, or coastal hurricane threat, this may not be a meaningful community 
emergency preparedness message. In a community with no fixed hazard, evacuation routes 
will likely vary depending on the threat and many respondents may answer these questions 
in the negative. They may not be listening to the message because it is not relevant for that 
community and its citizens. Measuring knowledge of a non-existent and unneeded evacu-
ation route gives a false reading on the levels of preparedness in that community. In the 
above example, the result may not be an accurate estimate of preparedness.  
F. BARRIERS TO ACTION 
The commonly held belief is that barriers, real or perceived, have a direct bearing 
on an individual’s ability and desire to prepare for disasters. All four surveys attempted to 
identify barriers to action. The Citizen Preparedness Review, Issue 5 analyzed survey re-
sults that probed known barriers, such as lack of concern, time, money, or knowledge about 
what actions to take. A significant number of respondents (62 percent) cited money as a 
reason for why they have not adequately prepared. Less than half of the respondents (37 
percent) cite lack of time as a reason for inadequate preparedness, and 44 percent say lack 
of knowledge on how to prepare hinders their efforts. Approximately one-half of the re-
spondents simply do not think disaster is very likely, and 45 percent have not thought about 
it much either way (FEMA, 2007 p. 8).  
The 2011 survey asked respondents to address four perceived barriers to prepared-
ness: cost, lack of knowledge, lack of time, and belief that getting good information is too 
difficult. Of those four, 25 percent believed that the cost was prohibitive, 24 percent felt 
they did not know how to prepare, 18 percent did not think they had time, and 17 percent 
noted it was too difficult to get information. Overall, more than 75 percent of the respond-
ents perceived some sort of obstacle to their ability to prepare (FEMA, 2009, p. 12).  
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To date, each survey indicates a slow rate of progress in personal preparedness and 
in some areas, a decrease. In 2007, 53 percent of the respondents reported having emer-
gency supplies set aside in their home to be used only during disaster. In 2009, the number 
of positive responses crept up to a peak of 57 percent. By 2012, the number was down to 
52 percent (FEMA, 2009, p. 8). In 2007, 37 percent of the respondents reported having a 
household emergency plan. In 2009, the number inched up to 41 percent and fell back to 
39 percent in 2012 (FEMA, 2009, p. 8).  
Overall, the number of individuals prepared for disaster remains stagnant. While 
the surveys are valuable, they measure personal preparedness based on a very specific set 
of actions defined by government leaders. Some of these actions may be universally desired 
and common to every citizen in every part of the country. However, some may not be 
appropriate or logical given the area’s risk or capacity of the individual. In those cases, the 
survey respondent may have determined the cost of preparedness as it relates to a specific 
action is not justified. What may be perceived by officials as barriers, may in fact be ra-
tional decisions based on understanding of threat and the perceived cost to benefit ratio of 
preparedness. Measuring outcome as opposed to actions may require a different tool that 
considers how an individual may choose to act based on the way he or she senses and 
responds to an incident and how the assumed position a person takes in a situation will 




V. CYNEFIN FRAMEWORK—HARNESSING CHAOS 
Success is how high you bounce when you hit bottom. 
—George S. Patton 
Chapter IV looked at four FEMA surveys that measure understanding of risk, 
movement on specific preparedness actions and identification of barriers that may prevent 
action. Chapter V will look at the issue of personal preparedness from the perspective of 
the Cynefin framework and how an individual may choose to act based on the way he or 
she senses and responds to an incident. 
Cynefin is a Welsh word that means habitat or place. However, according to David 
Snowden, a Welsh academic and researcher, it more properly defines the idea that everyone 
has multiple affiliations (culture, history, religion, and ethnicity) (Kurtz & Snowden, 2003, 
p.467). While one may not be fully cognizant of those connections, they influence percep-
tion and action through personal experience as well as collective narratives (Kurtz & Snow-
den, 2003, p. 467). Snowden and Cynthia F. Kurtz presented the Cynefin Framework in 
their 2003 article, “The New Dynamics of Strategy: Sense-Making in a Complex and Com-
plicated World.” Furthermore, Snowden and Kurtz considered Cynefin a sense-making 
framework, a model that helps individuals give meaning to experience.  
The Cynefin framework organizes situations into five distinct domains, based on 
the correlation between cause and effect. The five domains range from simple to compli-
cated, complex to chaotic. Disorder is the wild card, the center of the space with no primary 
relationship to the other four. The movement between the domains is not linear; in other 
words, it does not have to flow from simple to complicated and so on. In fact, based on the 
situation, it is relatively easy to move from the simple domain directly into chaotic if the 
problems and issues are not addressed appropriately. 
Within the Cynefin framework, the simple domain is characterized by stable situa-
tions with clear cause and effect relationships. In this domain, leaders must “sense, catego-
rize, and respond to a situation” (Snowden & Boone, 2007, p. 2). It is a domain where there 
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is little need for discussion because the right answer or decision is obvious. This domain 
tends toward one clear problem, one clear solution.  
According to Snowden and Boone, this is the “realm of the known knowns.” (2007, 
p. 2). In many regards, this is where personal preparedness messaging is in America. How-
ever, disasters and the impacts they cause are not simple; minute changes in the situation 
can cause huge shifts in the outcome. Actions can be oversimplified and may not be suffi-
cient to render an individual resilient or even prepared. Therein lies the first risk of assum-
ing emergency preparedness can operate in the simple domain. A problem occurs, an evac-
uation is ordered, and people move to safety. However, this is only valid if there is a defined 
threat with a clear evacuation route, such as one might find along the coast, in an area prone 
to hurricanes. Contrast this with an area with no defined threat. If an evacuation is called 
in Columbus, Ohio, the residents must know what and where the threat is to be able to 
successfully evacuate. Is the threat from a chemical plant in the south end? Go north on 
State Route 315, High Street or Interstate 71. If the threat is to the west, go east on State 
Route 161, Broad Street, or Interstate 70. Without a defined, pre-identified threat, expect-
ing citizens to know an evacuation route is futile. To call an evacuation in Columbus with-
out identifying the location of the threat and a clear evacuation route may in fact move the 
situation right into chaotic. The expectation that people know the community’s evacuation 
route without a fixed hazard is operating in the simple domain. The second domain may be 
more appropriate. 
The second domain is the complicated domain or according to Snowden and Boone, 
the “realm of the known unknowns (2007, p. 3).” This domain, unlike the simple, may have 
multiple right answers to a given question. The cause and effect relationship is in place, 
but they are not clearly evident to everyone. In this domain, leaders must “sense, analyze 
and respond” as opposed to in the simple domain where leaders must “sense, categorize 
and respond” (2007). This domain relies on experts to analyze the situation and ultimately, 
someone must pick the best solution among many right solutions. Disaster response at the 
governmental level tends toward the complicated domain. Experts gather data and provide 
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solutions to the decision makers, who ultimately manage the event. Even though the situa-
tion may be fluid and there may be many right answers, the leader will, based on infor-
mation and analysis, select the one solution he or she determines is best. Using the example 
of an approaching hurricane, the experts will identify the risk and potential impacts, assess 
the situation to determine the appropriate guidance to the public (evacuation or shelter), 
and then act (issue public information and initiate response). However, for many individu-
als, agreeing that evacuation is the right decision for them and then being prepared to do 
so when advised, may more appropriately belong in the complex domain. Many issues may 
be factored into that decision, such as cost, physical ability, location of threat versus avail-
ability of safe shelter, and history of similar events. What may appear to be a decision that 
lies in the simple or even complicated domains for government can quickly slide into com-
plex for individuals. Government officials must be mindful that while their decisions may 
fall squarely in the complicated domain, an individual decision to adhere to government 
guidance may belong in the complex domain. 
Although a right answer may be in the complex domain, it may not be known until 
much after the fact. This domain is unpredictable and outcomes are not clear; in this do-
main, leaders must probe, sense and then respond. Snowden and Boone call this domain 
the “realm of the unknown unknowns” (2007, p. 5). Disasters and disaster preparedness 
are complex problems and the solutions are unpredictable and in many cases, not evident 
until after the event. Choosing to evacuate from a hurricane in advance, may or may not be 
beneficial or even feasible for some people. The hurricane may veer out to sea, making 
some feel the cost of the evacuation was unwarranted. The projected landfall may be far 
enough north or south that the risk of evacuation is outweighed by sheltering in place. Lack 
of transportation or physical impairment may make the evacuation difficult if not impossi-
ble. Determining that the right decision was made may not be known until after the storm 
has passed. Leaders must be willing to consider all available actions to get to the desired 
outcome recognizing that the final result may not immediately be known. 
The fourth domain is chaotic. In this domain, there is no clear cause and effect and 
the shifting landscape makes the attempt to find the right answer an exercise in futility. 
Snowden and Boone call this the “realm of the unknowables” and place September 11, 
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2001 into this domain (2007, p. 5). In this domain, the only response is to act quickly and 
decisively to create stability and move the situation from chaotic to complex. Post-Hurri-
cane Katrina, the scene in New Orleans was clearly chaotic. One of the ways the govern-
ment gained control of the situation was to begin mass relocation of survivors to other areas 
of the country. One might argue that this was not the most effective model, but it did bring 
a measure of order to the chaos by reducing the numbers of survivors that needed assistance 
in a city with no resources. 
The final domain, disorder is a wild card. With no clear relationship to any of the 
other domains, disorder reigns, and the response is up for grabs by whomever can dominate 
the playground. Once the dominant players take control, they will default to the character-
istics of the domain in which they are most comfortable operating or which meets their 
ultimate goal. According to Kurtz and Snowden, in an emerging situation, there is value in 
decision makers agreeing to reduce the size of this domain to achieve consensus on action 
(2003).  
The challenge we face in America is we have placed much of individual prepared-
ness in the simple domain, one problem and one right answer. Some actions, such as pre-
paredness kits or plans may land in the complicated domain, with many right solutions. In 
other circumstances, the resources, capabilities, understanding and history of a potential 
threat may move an individual response into the complex domain with many known and 
unknown solutions with no right answer immediately evident. 
According to Snowden and Boone, there are several ways to manage the uncertain-
ties of complicated and complex situations. Opening up discussions with impacted indi-
viduals can lead to innovative ideas that meet the needs of the stakeholders. Encouraging 
expression of opinions can allow for the formation of well-defined and thoughtful solutions 
that recognize diverse, yet positive, outcomes. Being prepared for and managing emerging 
situations rather than trying to force an identified action can create an environment where 
the focus is on outcomes, not actions. In the case of disaster, this reflects a resilient public. 
The finite steps to preparedness, simple solutions to a relatively known problem become 
far less important in this model. A diverse and dynamic set of flexible solutions created by 
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the stakeholders is what is needed in this complicated and complex environment, which 
ultimately leads to the desired outcome, a resilient society. Rather, the messages emergency 
managers espouse to the public should be cognizant of what senses individuals may use 
based on the complexity of a situation, and how they may then choose to act based on the 
way they sense and respond to an incident. In that manner, the method used to encourage 
preparedness may be less prescriptive and more optional, and as a result, lead to the desired 
outcome of a resilient society. 
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VI. POSITIONING THEORY—CHANGING THE OUTCOME 
Words are singularly the most powerful force available to humanity. We 
can choose to use this force constructively with words of encouragement, 
or destructively using words of despair. Words have energy and power with 
the ability to help, to heal, to hinder, to hurt, to harm, to humiliate and to 
humble. 
—Yehuda Berg 
This chapter discusses personal preparedness from the frame of positioning theory, 
which looks at the roles and rights, duties, and responsibilities that individuals assume 
based on their perceived or actual position in the world. A 2009 article published in Theory 
and Psychology, “Recent Advances in Positioning Theory,” by Harre et al., explored new 
applications of the use of positioning theory to explain interpersonal encounters. Based on 
this theory, individuals can choose, or be placed in, the role of victim or survivor. That 
placement will then influence an individual’s perception of his or her rights as well as 
responsibilities.  
Positioning theory evolved out of role theory, a social psychological model that 
contends each person responds to situations based on his or her defined role (wife, student, 
child, and father). Within each role there are established behaviors that each person must 
fulfill to be successful within that assigned role. As such, people behave in a predictable 
fashion consistent with the role (“Role Theory,” n.d.). This theory posits that roles are static 
and generally not flexible. If a woman gives birth, she is a mother, and there are societal 
expectations of her in the role of mother. Likewise, a college student is expected to perform 
certain actions, such as attend class, take exams, and turn in required assignments. If she 
fails to perform these actions, then at some point, she will be expelled and no longer con-
sidered performing the role of college student, at least at that institution. Some roles are 
arbitrary and unchangeable. For example, a Caucasian male cannot arbitrarily decide to 
change his ethnicity, although recent advances in medical science may allow him to change 
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his gender thereby changing his role in society from Jim, Caucasian male, to Jane, a Cau-
casian female. Regardless of gender, Jim/Jane’s ethnic role is Caucasian and that is not 
subject to change, at least at this point in history.  
According to Davies and Harre, in their article “Positioning: The Discursive Pro-
duction of Selves,” the challenge with role theory, is that evaluating actions identified by 
roles is static and based on formal, ritualistic aspects. They contend that how people posi-
tion themselves may be a more reliable precursor to their actions than their static role. A 
key element in positioning theory is belief that language not only communicates but shapes 
the way individuals act based on how they position themselves relative to the language 
used (Davies & Harre, 2007, p. 2). Craig Fugate understood this when he reframed those 
impacted by disasters from “victims” to “survivors,” first, as director of the Florida Divi-
sion of Emergency Management and then as the administrator of FEMA (Whitehead, 
2009). 
Discourse, or dialogue, creates a framework in which one positions himself or oth-
ers. The assumption of position will determine where and individual is placed in the narra-
tive. Davies and Harre (2007, p. 4) assert there are two ways individuals get positioned into 
the narrative: interactive positioning and reflective positioning. In reflective positioning, 
the individual defines his or her own position, and interactive positioning is defined by 
someone else. In both cases, the positioning may or may not be intentional. However, just 
as conversations shift and change based on input, an individual’s position can flex based 
on how the dialogue changes the narrative, and, therefore, where each player in fits into 
the storyline (2007, pp. 2–3). 
Messages vary based on the context in which they are given, not just within the 
relationship of the sender and receiver, but the historicity of the message and language 
(Harre, 2004, p. 5). Before September 2005, Katrina was just a name; post-Hurricane 
Katrina, it became not only a historic marker in American history, but it was a descriptor 
of a catastrophic event. In 2009, U.S. Congressman Zach Wamp described a coal ash spill 
at a Tennessee Valley Authority plant as “a Katrina-like event” in his plea to the federal 
government for recovery dollars (Collins, 2009) The headline for a March 2013 article on 
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the Livescience website is “Katrina-Like Storm Surges Could Become the Norm” (Oskin, 
2013). And during a press conference in advance of Hurricane Sandy, Connecticut Gover-
nor Dannel Malloy urged residents to move to high ground, saying “this is a rather Katrina-
like warning” (CBS New York, 2012). In each case, the term “Katrina-like” evokes a spe-
cific meaning that Americans correctly interpret to mean an event with catastrophic conse-
quences. Without the context of the 2005 hurricane, the term would be meaningless. In the 
same sense, 9–11 now means something very different from what it meant on September 
10, 2001. On that day, if someone said the phrase “nine-eleven” in a public safety context, 
the listener might have assumed that the speaker meant to say “nine-one-one,” referring to 
emergency dispatching. It would be difficult to imagine a listener making that mistake to-
day. Dictionary.com now has a definition of 9/11 or 9–11, referring to the terrorist attacks 
that occurred on September 11, 2001 at the World Trade Center in New York City, the 
Pentagon in Virginia, and the plane crash in western Pennsylvania. Again, the historicity 
aligned with the context of the phrase changes the meaning entirely. Add to that context 
the position of an individual relative to the attack and again, the phrase will elicit an entirely 
different response. A fire fighter from New York City will react to a reference to 9–11 
much differently than a schoolteacher from St. Louis. Likewise, a survivor of Hurricane 
Katrina who is asked to prepare for a disaster might respond differently than a resident of 
Columbus, Ohio who has never experienced a major flood let alone a catastrophic event. 
The individuals’ physical location, history, and personal positioning play a critical element 
in their willingness to prepare and understanding of risk.  
FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate’s attempt to reframe victims of disasters to sur-
vivors is consistent with the concept of positioning theory. By positioning individuals im-
pacted by disaster as survivors, FEMA is helping them assume the responsibility to be 
accountable for their own survival, as well as an implied duty to help others. By assuming 
the role of survivors, they become not only enablers in their own response and recovery, 
but allow government resources to focus on those who are positioned, regardless of cause, 
as victims. In the role of survivors, they may even feel a responsibility to provide for others 
more impacted than themselves or their families. 
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Individuals placed in the role of “victim” may feel justified in abdicating any re-
sponsibility for preparedness, survival or recovery, which requires the government to fill 
that role. In that case, they will also likely feel they have a right to certain provisions and 
benefits: ice, food, water, and shelter in the immediate aftermath of an event and govern-
ment grants or loans during recovery. As victims, they may feel these rights are inviolable 
and can feel betrayed if their needs are not met to the standard they believe is warranted.  
The position an individual is placed in or places himself in is not static. The envi-
ronment, other individuals involved in the encounter, and outside stimulus all change the 
framework of the interpersonal relationship and the position of the individual relative to 
role, rights, responsibilities, and duties. Consequently, an individual may assume the role 
of a survivor for an event that is either familiar or planned. Many individuals who live 
along the Ohio River in southern and eastern Ohio are relatively sanguine about the flood 
risk from the river. To them, the risk is part of river life, and they have plans in place to 
move their possessions and their families to higher elevation when river flooding is pre-
dicted. When the water recedes, they clean up their homes and property and resume their 
daily activities. The most responsible residents maintain flood insurance, understanding 
that in the event of flooding, flood insurance will provide the greatest assurance of recov-
ery. Within the framework of positioning theory, they have demonstrated a closer nexus to 
survivor than victim. They accept the risk of flooding as well as the responsibility to pre-
pare and recover from that risk. However, since positions are not static, rights and respon-
sibilities shift as new patterns emerge. In the event of a less common disaster, such as a 
tornado or chemical event, they may be less prepared and therefore more likely to assume 
the role of victim. In this case, they may be more inclined to wait for outside assistance and 
may feel betrayed if that assistance is not readily offered. 
In his September 2004 article “Positioning Theory,” Harre suggests that if roles as 
identified within the framework of role theory are relatively inflexible and static, then po-
sitioning theory is about how humans change their positions based on the transitory and 
conflicting nature of language. According to Harre, people use three primary conditions to 
create their basis for action. The first is admissible social acts, in particular the illocutionary 
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force, in which the meaning of a phrase or word is based on who is using it, where it is 
used and for what purpose. For instance the variations in meaning of the phrase “excuse 
me” can range from “excuse me,” (for bumping into someone), to “excuse me?” (I didn’t 
hear you) to “excuse me!”(for breathing).  
The second condition is the distribution of rights and duties. Each individual 
right/duty is a position. Catholics have a duty to confess their sins and perform acts of 
contrition. Once this is done, they have the right to participate in communion. A baseball 
player has a duty to participate in practices; if he does so, then he has the right wear the 
uniform and participate in games. Much like the example of the student in the earlier dis-
cussion on roles, this condition is reflective of both role and position.  
The third condition is the story line or narrative in which an individual participates. 
An overseas deployment to Germany may be the opportunity of a lifetime for one soldier 
and an excruciating ordeal for another, depending on how they position themselves in the 
narrative. Harre believes that each of these conditions influence the other creating a posi-
tioning “triangle.” (2004, pp. 7–8). The position assumed by an individual, in tandem with 
her rights and duties will impact understanding of the illocutionary force of dialogue or 
message. These, in turn, may be influenced by the narrative or storyline of the event.  
An article in the Forum: Qualitative Social Research by Francisco Tirado and Ana 
Galvez on the impact of conflict adds a new element to the concept of positioning theory 
and personal preparedness (Tirado & Galvez, 2007). They suggest that conflict can be an 
opportunity for change as opposed to the traditional view that conflict is negative. Mer-
riam-Webster’s online dictionary offers two definitions of conflict that inform the discus-
sion on positioning theory. The first is “competitive or opposing action of incompatibles: 
antagonistic state or action (as of divergent ideas, interest or persons)” The second defini-
tion is “a mental struggle resulting from incompatible or opposing needs, drives, wishes or 
external or internal demands.” (“Conflict,” n.d.) 
In both of these definitions, one can see the conflict that arises within the field of 
emergency preparedness. The barriers identified in the preparedness surveys identify areas 
of incompatible or opposing needs, expending limited dollars on a preparedness kit that 
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may be used sometime in the future, or using those same dollars to meet an immediate or 
more pressing need. Taking time to learn about area risks and develop a plan or spending 
that time on work or leisure activities. Measuring external demands by government to take 
actions now to prepare for a future risk against an internal voice that resists those actions 
for other, perhaps equally compelling demands.  
Individuals can choose, or be placed in, the role of victim or survivor. They can 
choose or be placed in role of responder or casualty. That placement will then influence an 
individual’s perception of his or her rights as well as responsibilities. If messaging is re-
flective of personal perception of self and personal perception is defined by language and 
dialogue, then is it critical that those who prepare the messages use appropriate language 
to foster positive positioning. Craig Fugate was dead on when he reframed victims as sur-
vivors. He used words to inspire a different context for those who have lived through dis-
aster and by doing so encourage a stronger, more resilient self-image of disaster survivors. 
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VII. MOVE THE NEEDLE 
Think left and think right and think low and think high. Oh, the thinks you 
can think up if only you try! 
—Dr. Seuss 
A. IS THE NEEDLE BROKEN?  
This thesis explored why, after millions of dollars and years of public campaigns, 
many Americans are not prepared for disaster, at least as preparedness is defined by FEMA 
and our nations’ emergency management community. The research question addressed the 
actions the public is asked to take and whether the public perceives they are practical and 
sustainable based on barriers, such as income and lifestyle, and reasonable based on iden-
tified risk. 
This research began with several assumptions: 
• Current preparedness campaigns seem to imply that once the action is taken, 
the individual is prepared yet the investment in effort and money may be 
significant.  
• To achieve the desired outcome, the message must be redefined to ensure 
the actions being asked are reasonable, sustainable, and realistic.  
• The public must understand the message, believe the actions requested are 
valid, and be able to act appropriately for the overall preparedness outcome 
to be achieved.  
• The current preparedness campaigns do not appear to changing long term 
behavior which will lead to the desired outcome. That is, a more resilient 
population.  
• If the standard approach the emergency management community has used 
for the last several decades is flawed, then the needle might not simply be 
stuck. It may, along with the entire system, be broken.  
• Perhaps the problem is not just with the needle, which is simply measuring 
action or inaction, but with the actions themselves and the messages used to 
promote them.  
Millions of dollars have been spent trying to convince members of the public to 
take responsibility for their personal preparedness. Regardless of the approach taken, the 
percentage of individuals and families that appear to be prepared for disaster has remained 
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relatively stagnant, resulting in the analogy that the needle is stuck. Joe Becker, from the 
American Red Cross suggested the challenge is to get the needle moving on the percentage 
of those who are prepared (2009, p. 4). FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate has said that 
families who fail to take basic steps to prepare for disaster pull responders from those who 
in critical need of help (2009, pp.10–11). Garry Briese argues that the bar for preparedness 
is too high and personal preparedness should be refined to those actions most important to 
the outcome. 
B. FINDINGS  
Successful public safety campaigns, such as “Stop, drop and roll” and “Click it or 
ticket,” generally require a low investment in cost and time and have a clear and compelling 
negative outcome if the action is not taken. The current preparedness actions require an 
investment in time—to acquire knowledge, develop a plan, prepare a kit—and money to 
purchase and store the items for a kit. To be effective, both the plan and kit must be main-
tained.  
With a few exceptions, researchers agree that understanding and agreeing with risk 
is a driving factor in an individual’s desire to be personally prepared. Some jurisdictions, 
such as California, are using technology to help their residents understand the threats and 
risks of the community. It is past time for the emergency management community at large 
to recognize that threats and risks are not universal and one generic message is not suffi-
cient.  
Positioning theory advances that language not only communicates, but shapes the 
way individuals act based on how they “position” themselves relative to the language used 
(Davies & Harre, 2007, p. 2). FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate’s attempt to reframe vic-
tims of disasters to survivors is consistent with this concept of positioning theory. By po-
sitioning individuals impacted by disaster as survivors, FEMA is helping them assume the 
responsibility to be accountable for their own survival, as well as an implied duty to help 
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others. By assuming the role of survivor, they become not only enablers in their own re-
sponse and recovery but allow government resources to focus on those who are positioned, 
regardless of cause, as victims. 
While the surveys are exhaustive, they measure personal preparedness based on a 
very specific set of actions defined by government leaders. Some of these actions may be 
universally desired and common to every citizen in every part of the country. However, 
some may not be appropriate or logical so the survey respondents may have determined 
the cost of preparedness as it relates to a specific action is not warranted or justified. What 
may be perceived as barriers, may in fact be rational decisions based on understanding of 
threat. According to a report released by FEMA in 2013, the percentage of Americans who 
have taken actions to prepare remains largely unchanged since 2007 (FEMA, 2009, p. 1). 
Knowing how to prepare and expense of preparation continues to be perceived as barriers 
by 25 percent of those surveyed (2013, p. 12). 
Often individual preparedness is framed as simple, one problem, and one right an-
swer. Some actions, such as preparedness kits or plans may morph and become compli-
cated, with many potential solutions. During disasters, the availability of resources, capa-
bilities, understanding, and history of a potential threat may move an individual response 
into the complex domain with many known and unknown solutions with no right answer 
immediately evident. 
A 2008 Columbia University report suggests that a fundamental lack of trust that 
loved ones will be protected must be resolved if the disconnect between evacuation plans 
and individual action is to be eliminated (Redlener et al., 2008, p. 6). Even with known 
threats, the surveys indicate high levels of reluctance to evacuate, particularly if the re-
spondent is unsure that her or his children or loved ones would be protected (2008). Each 
of these findings points back to last two hypotheses: if the needle is broken, perhaps the 
problem is with the actions the public is asked to take.  
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
As the emergency management community continues to challenge the public to 
prepare, there are several recommendations that may encourage a more resilient popula-
tion. Reframing what preparedness looks like, focusing on outcomes, rather than actions 
and looking for new ways to include the community in the conversation may prompt new 
ways to prepare for disasters. Rethinking how preparedness is measured and conducting 
studies on whether actions actually effect outcome will allow more refinement of the mes-
sage and rigor to the conversation. Finally, recognizing personal choice and planning for 
action, as well as inaction, will allow emergency managers to better prepare for the needs 
of their populations. 
(1) Reframe the Concept of Preparedness 
A disaster kit, prepackaged and stored away to be only used in a disaster is not 
practical or sustainable action for many Americans. It is costly and takes time, attention, 
and desire to maintain. Reframing the requirement away from a disaster kit to one that 
focuses on the ability to sustain self and family for 72 hours with supplies currently on 
hand may be far more achievable for most Americans. For instance, pantry stocked with 
canned goods and daily supplies that can be opened and eaten cold if necessary may be a 
better option than a packaged emergency supply kit loaded with Spam and cans of tuna. 
The most effective preparedness solution for individuals and families challenged by lack 
of money or storage may be to identify a nearby location, either with family or friends, 
where they can safely weather the storm. Some campaigns and approaches are beginning 
to look for alternate ways for individuals to be prepared, relying less on the kit concept and 
more on an outcome of preparedness, whatever that looks like. 
(2) Focus on the Outcome Rather Than Actions 
The steps to preparedness—get a kit, make a plan, be informed, be involved—sim-
ple solutions to a relatively known problem become far less important. A diverse and dy-
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namic set of flexible solutions created by the stakeholders is what is needed in this compli-
cated and complex environment, ultimately leading to the desired outcome, a resilient so-
ciety. 
(3) Create Opportunities for Dialogue with Impacted Individuals with no Preset 
Outcome 
Communication with the public, as opposed to emergency managers and profes-
sional communicators, may lead to innovative ideas that meet the needs in non-traditional 
ways.  
(4) Refine Personal Preparedness Surveys to Allow for Measurement of Alter-
nate Ways to Prepared May Actually Result in a More Prepared Individual 
While it may be valuable to ask the standard question about a preparedness kit set 
aside to be used only during disaster, it is important to probe the negative responses to get 
a more accurate level of preparedness. Asking questions about stored food not in a kit or 
the ability to access stored water in other areas of the home not only measures a different 
type of preparedness, it moves the discussion about preparedness in new and equally valid 
directions. 
(5) Conduct Post-Disaster Studies of the Efficacy of Personal Preparedness 
The author could find no studies on whether being prepared makes a family more 
resilient or, as just more comfortable. There appears to be no empirical evidence appears 
to support the common assumption that when the waters rise, the wind blows, or the earth 
shakes, someone who “has a kit, a plan and is informed,” has a greater chance of survival 
and successful recovery than his neighbor, who does not. Emergency management web-
sites and publications seem to posit that personal preparedness pays dividends in lessened 
impacts and faster recovery; however, there do not appear to be readily available post-
disaster statistics to validate that claim.  
(6) Consider That Perhaps the Needle Has Moved as Far as It Can 
Maybe the needle is stuck on half full because that is all the juice there is. Perhaps 
it is time to recognize that those who can are preparing, although perhaps not to the standard 
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the government proposes. Some of those who are not prepared may intentionally be choos-
ing to refuse that role. Others may be placed, by choice or circumstance, in the victim role 
and may be unable to prepare. Emergency preparedness campaigns should continue, albeit 
with a reframed message that better reflects practical, sustainable, and risk appropriate ac-
tions, but it may be time to stop obsessing over the lack of preparedness. While the emer-
gency management community can continue to march to the drumbeat of “get a kit, make 
a plan, be informed,” it must recognize that many may choose to ignore that beat and march 
instead to their own. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
To date, there do not appear to be any studies that measure, post disaster, whether 
being personally prepared makes a difference in the outcome. Conducting case studies post 
may be able to validate the preparedness measures that proved most effective, as well as 
those that were not planned but emerged as a result of the situation. Studies should continue 
on the impact risk plays in individual preparedness as well as the impact of barriers, real 
or perceived. A glaring gap in the literature surrounding the current preparedness program 
is one of efficacy. The author was unable to locate surveys, studies, or analyses that deter-
mine whether or not personal preparedness kits or plans really make a difference. No em-
pirical evidence appears to exist that supports the common assumption that when the waters 
rise, the wind blows, or the earth shakes, someone who “has a kit, a plan and is informed” 
has a greater chance of survival and successful recovery than his or her neighbor, who does 
not. Experts believe that personal preparedness pays dividends in lessened impacts and 
faster recovery; but there do not appear to be post-disaster statistics that are least readily 
available to validate that claim.  
More analysis of individual preparedness and recovery from the framework of the 
positioning theory may provide valuable insight into why individuals either accept or reject 
the role of survivor. Understanding how people are positioned, or position themselves, may 
help reframe the messages to encourage personal acceptance of individual duty. In addi-
tion, it may allow government to have a more realistic discussion about its responsibility 
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to individuals post disaster and may help reframe their assumed rights of immediate re-
sponse. 
A review of the Cynefin framework and the positioning theory within the context 
individual choice for action or inaction provided a valuable insight into personal perception 
of self and how individuals may choose respond based on how they frame themselves 
within a situation.  
As the frequency and cost of disasters increases, a clear understanding of and agree-
ment on the desired outcome of preparedness is more important than simply measuring kits 
and plans. There are many roads to resiliency; encouraging multiple paths may lead to a 
stronger, sounder, more resilient solution that driving everyone down the same highway. 
At the end of the day, the fact that all get to the final destination is what is important; how 
they get there is negotiable. 
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